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Abstract

As of 1989 more than one-fifth of the nation's
federally insured saving and loans institutions have
negative net worth.

Very little is known, however, about

their pricing behavior of financial assets.

Host of the

existing literature has focused on whether insolvent
institutions bid up their cost of funds.

The asset pricing

issue of insolvent institutions has not been examined in the
mortgage literature.

This dissertation extends the

literature by examining whether failed or failing saving and
loan institutions offer their conventional fixed- and
adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount relative to solvent
institutions.

A theoretical argument for the underpricing

proposition is presented based on the premises that
insolvent lending institution use the conditional repayment
probability and do not consider capital losses due to an
adverse shift in interest rates in setting credit rates.
Therefore, insolvent lending institutions will tend to offer
lower contractual interest rates on mortgages than wellcapitalized institutions.

Using a national data set three

empirical tests are performed: a Chow test, a Goldfeld and
Quandt test, and the Tishler and Zang maximum likelihood
optimization technique.

The results show that failed or

failing saving and loans institutions do, indeed, offer
their conventional fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages at a
discount relative to healthy lending institutions.
x

Failed or Failing Landing Institutions Behavior
and Implications for the Pricing of Mortgages
chapter I

introduction

Over the past few years the unsuccessful attempts to
contain the escalating problems in the saving and loans
industry have led to alarming headlines in the financial
press about lending institutions failures, buyouts, and
forced mergers.

Also, there are dismal predictions of the

imminent collapse of the entire thrift industry.

Many

thrifts— approximately one-fifth of all federally insured
thrift institutions— are negative-net-worth institutions
that are being gradually closed.
Very little is known about the pricing behavior of
these failed or failing lending institutions, in spite of
the fact that more than 200 lending institutions failed
during the 1986 to 1989 period and about 400 of the nation's
3000 federally insured saving and loans institutions are
currently insolvent.

Most of the existing literature in

this area has focused on whether failed or failing
institutions bid up their cost of funds.

The issue of

underpricing by these failed or failing institutions is not
currently examined in the mortgage pricing literature.

1

z
In light of this gap, this dissertation attempts to
extend the literature by examining whether failed or failing
lending institutions underprice their mortgage products.

It

is argued that insolvent thrift institutions will
systematically underbid their products by offering mortgage
loans at a discount.

Implications from a simple theoretical

model are analyzed with respect to the pricing of
conventional mortgage loans using data obtained from the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) monthly interest rate
survey.

The remainder of this dissertation is structured as

follows.
In chapter II, a brief review of the extant literature
on disparities in the mortgage pricing behavior of lending
institutions is presented.

In particular, regional

variation in mortgage yields and differences in lending
practices among financial institutions are discussed.

This

chapter also briefly reviews the evidence on wellcapitalized lending institutions in the presence of
federally deposit insurance programs and whether failed or
failing lending institutions bid up their cost of funds.
The ability of lending institutions to bid up their cost of
funds is due, in part, to the existence of a flat-rate
deposit insurance premium.
Chapter III examines the pricing of fixed and
adjustable-rate mortgages.

The chapter starts out with a

contingent-claims model of fixed-rate mortgages and

3

illustrates the pricing implications for insolvent
institutions when the assumption regarding the conditional
probability of remaining solvent is relaxed.

This chapter

argues that failed or failing institutions may price their
fixed-rate mortgage loan products at a lower rate than wellcapitalized lending institutions.

This argument is based on

the premise that well-capitalized lending institutions will
worry about the conditional probability that the institution
will remain solvent when pricing their mortgage products.
On the other hand, failed or failing lending institutions
that may have only a small chance of regaining solvency in
the future period will not care about borrower defaults.

It

is further showed that insolvent institutions may also
underprice the interest rate risks.

Their ability to do so

is to a large extent is due to the unsymmetrical nature of
their capital gain and loss functions.

All of the capital

gains from a favorable shift in the term structure of
interest rates accrue to the institutions while most of the
capital losses are of no consequences to their already
insolvent conditions.

Therefore, these insolvent

institutions can underprice their loan products by offering
fixed-rate mortgages at a discount relative to the healthy
lending institutions.
The same argument can also be made for adjustable rate
mortgages.

Insolvent institutions may offer adjustable-rate

mortgages at a discount in order to encourage or allow

continued borrowing.

Moreover, because adjustable-rate

mortgage borrowers are better off with lower points, tighter
caps, or greater teaser rates, failed or failing lending
institutions may offer adjustable-rate mortgages with fairly
large teaser rates, tighter interest-rate caps, or lower
discount points.
The differential pricing mechanism between solvent and
insolvent lending institutions is further illustrated in
appendix A with a simple model.

It is argued that since the

failed or failing lending institution uses the conditional
repayment probability in setting credit rates, it will use a
higher repayment probability than a solvent lending
institution.

As the result, the failed or failing lending

institution will rationally offer a lower contractual
interest rate on mortgages than would a well-capitalized
lending institution making the same loan.
Chapter IV presents three estimation techniques to test
whether failed or failing institutions systematically
underbid their mortgage loans.

In particular, the Chow, the

Goldfeld and Quandt, and the Tishler and Zang estimation
techniques are described.

These three approaches will be

used to test for the underpricing of fixed-and adjustablerate mortgages
The empirical testings and results are then presented
in Chapters V and VI.

The three estimation techniques

described in the previous chapter are applied to the pricing

of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs). The chapters start

with the pricing estimation of

FRMs and ARMs respectively and end with the analysis and
discussion of results.
theory section.

The results are consistent with the

That is, failed or failing institutions do

underprice their mortgage loans.
will conclude the dissertation.

And finally, Chapter VII

Chapter II
Literature Review

Mortgage pricing is one area of security valuation
theory that has received a great deal of attention in recent
years.

Empirical studies are accumulating rapidly and, at

the same time, important developments in the theoretical
pricing of mortgage instruments are taking place.

As yet,

however, there is very little known about the institutional
disparities in mortgage pricing and, more specifically,
whether failed or failing lending institutions
systematically underprice their mortgage loan products.
Most econometric tests of differences in lending behavior
have focused instead on whether failed or failing lending
institutions bid up their cost of funds.
This chapter will review the extant literature on
mortgage pricing.

Included in this brief literature review

is a survey of the theoretical and empirical studies dealing
with regional variation in mortgage pricing and differences
in lending behavior among financial institution.

A summary

concludes this chapter.

2.1.

Variations in Mortgage Pricing

Variations in mortgage rates across time have
traditionally been related to two variables:
uncertainty and default risk.

interest-rate

Mortgage rates should

increase with interest-rate uncertainty since mortgage
6
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borrowers generally have the option to terminate the
mortgage at their discretion.

Exercise of this option is

typically motivated by a desire to reduce borrowing costs
and will systematically reduce the lending institution's
yield by the same amount.

This is not a risk of loss or

uncertainty, but has a measurable expected loss for which
lending institutions must be compensated.
Formal models for the pricing of interest-rate
uncertainty in mortgages are presented by Dunn and McConnell
(1981), Buser and Hendershott (1984), Cunningham and
Hendershott (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1985).

For

most of these models, interest rates are assumed to depend,
as in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), on the instantaneous
spot rate.

The change in the spot rate is modelled in

continuous time as an Ito's diffusion process.

Interest-

rate uncertainty is then explicitly introduced in these
models by viewing a default-free assumable fixed-rate
mortgage loans as a call option on the continuous annuity
payments.1 In equilibrium, the value of the borrower's
call option is assumed to be a function of the coupon rate,
the term to maturity, the interest rate structure, and other

^ n light of these similarities, much of the pricing
models of mortgages are based on the option pricing literature
which was originally developed by Black and Scholes (1973);
Merton (1973); Brennan and Schwartz (1977); and Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1985). Most of the mortgage pricing models do not
provide a closed analytical form solution with the exception
of Leung's (1987) model of a defsuitable mortgage. Therefore,
these models have to be solved by numerical methods.

8

characteristics of the contract.

Mortgage pricing models,

in general, use the principle of arbitrage or zero arbitrage
profits to determine the equilibrium mortgage prices.

The

ability to form a risk free portfolio gives these models a
basic equilibrium condition of a risk free return on a
synthetic portfolio.

Using this notion of no arbitrage, the

instantaneously riskless portfolio is formed by combining a
long position in the mortgage with a short position in
treasury bills, which results in a zero instantaneous
return.

This in turn enables mortgage pricing models to

prove that the instantaneous mortgage yield is equal to risk
free rate plus a premium.
Dunn and McConnell (1981) were the first to use
contingent-claims bond pricing models of Brennan and
Schwartz (1977) and the general equilibrium results of Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1976, 1985) to value mortgages.

Their

model assumes that the stochastic behavior of short term
rates will determine long term rates and that the
instantaneous riskless rate of interest follows a meanreverting stochastic process.

They use these assumptions to

examine the effect of interest rate uncertainty on the value
of GNMA mortgage-backed securities.2
The major difference between the Dunn and McConnell
model and other models of mortgage valuation is they utilize
2 Dunn and McConnell (1981) ignore default risk since
GNMA securities are default-free securities composed entirely
of pools of FHA- and VA-insured loans.

9

a Poisson-driven process to model the possibility of optimal
and suboptima1 mortgage prepayments.

Optimal mortgage

prepayments describe the situation when the value of the
outstanding mortgage balance is less than the current value
of the loan; that is, these prepayments occur only whenever
the market interest rate falls below the contract rate of
the mortgage, so that the existing debt can be refinanced
with a lower rate.

Suboptimal mortgage prepayments are made

when the market interest rate is higher than the contract
rate and usually occur owning to events such as divorce or
relocation.

To model these two types of prepayments, Dunn

and McConnell were forced to examine a non-amortizing
callable mortgage.
Buser and Hendershott (1984) expand the model of Dunn
and McConnell (1981) to examine the effect of different
parameter values on the value of the prepayment option and
the value of a non-defaultable mortgage.

In particular,

Buser and Hendershott include the cost of refinancing in
their model (instead of assuming no refinancing costs as in
Dunn and McConnell's model) to examine its impact on a
prepayable mortgage.

In Buser and Hendershott's model, the

term structure of interest rate is the only state variable
that governs the value of a fixed rate loan.

They find that

the relative values of the call option on 30- and 15-year
fixed-rate mortgages and graduated-payment mortgages to be
reasonably robust with respect to specifications of the

10

Interest-rate process.

For the 1970s, Buser and Hendershott

report the initial spread over Treasury yields ranged from
90 basis points to 350 basis points; higher values are found
for the 1980s.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) developed a two-state
partial differential equation to value default-free GNMA
mortgages.

Their model uses the instantaneously risk-free

rate and the yield on a consol bond as state variables.
Using the no arbitrage argument to form an instantaneous
risk free portfolio, Brennan and Schwartz were able to
derive pricing equations for default-free mortgages subject
to both short and long-term interest rates.

Brennan and

Schwartz, however, do not differentiate between suboptimal
and optimal prepayments.

Nevertheless, they were able to

show that their fundamental valuation equation is equivalent
to a valuation equation for an option on coupon-paying
security, as developed by Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1973), when the instantaneous risk-free rate is constant.
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) were the first to
examine the effect of default risk on mortgage values in a
contingent-claims pricing framework.

Their model assumes

that house prices are the only source of uncertainty in
mortgage valuation.

They model this uncertainty by assuming

a non-stochastic interest-rate environment and by making the
simplifying assumption that house prices follow a log-normal
distributed process.

They assume that default only occurs

11

if the price of the house falls below the level at which the
gains from defaulting on the mortgage is larger than the
costs of doing so.

The costs of default include relocating

costs (such as possible damages to credit rating), whereas
the benefits from defaulting are the recapture of negative
equity in the mortgaged house plus free rental services.
Cunningham and Hendershott assume that the free rent between
the date when the borrower is declared in default and the
date when the property is sold at a foreclosure sale is
equal to ten percent of the value of the house at the time
of default, and that the costs from defaulting are between
fifteen to thirty percent of the house.

Cunningham and

Hendershott use their model to price default risk and
insurance for FHA mortgages.
associated with default.

They found only a small costs

For example, for an 80% loan-to-

value ratio mortgage, a risk premium of 5 to 15 basis points
in the loan rate is charged when the standard deviation of
house price changes is around 5% per annum.
The effect of default risk on mortgage yields is also
analyzed by Masulis (1982), Epperson, ££ fii. (1985) and Kau,
(1986,1989).

These studies generally assume that

borrower defaults will occur when the recapture of negative
equity (i.e., the value of the mortgage less house value)
and the free rent earned between default and foreclosure
exceed the costs of default.

The Masulis (1982) study, for

example, examines the market value of real estate to model

12

the equity claim in a mortgage as a European option with a
lump-sum exercise price.

Xn this framework, the equity

claim on a house is viewed as a call option to buy the house
back from the mortgage lender at the time of maturity for a
price equal to the principal plus interest.
The studies of Epperson, fijfc al- (1985) and Kau,

al.

(1986,1989) assume that borrowers will exercise the option
to default at the date of a payment and only if the house
price is less than the mortgage outstanding balance.

They

find that default options are significant and sensitive to
changes in the term structure of interest rates.

In

addition, default risk may also vary cross-sectioning across
region.
Across regions, mortgage rates on equal-sized mortgage
loans collateralized by equal-valued houses should vary
because of potential differences in expected losses from
default.

These regional differences are generally thought

to arise owing to differences in expected house price
inflation/volatility and/or in state foreclosure laws.
Numerous studies have examined regional disparities in
mortgage interest rates (e.g. Furstensberg (1970), Heador
(1978), Zabrinski, Barth and Harlow (1982) and Horrell and
Saba (1983)).

For example, Zabrinski, Barth and Harlow

report an average differential in mortgage across regions to
be around one hundred basis points.

They find that these

differences in mortgage lending rates across regions can be

13

explained by such factors as legal barriers, variation in
market risks, and the heterogeneous nature of mortgage
instruments.

In addition, Morrell and Saba (1983) find that

regional differences in mortgage yields depend on secondary
mortgage market activity and mortgage standardization.

2.2.

Institutional Disparities in Mortgage Pricing

The theory suggests that institutional disparities in
mortgage yields may exist when the demand for mortgage
credit facing an individual lender is downward sloping
relative to interest rates or when borrowers lack perfect
information.

Either event could lead to differences in

average rates charged borrowers at savings and loan
associations (S&Ls) relative to interest rates.

This

relative difference in mortgage yields may depend on such
factors as the availability of S&L investable funds or on
origination costs.

In general, the effective rate on

conventional mortgage loans should equal the regional cost
of funds to the lender plus a differential that varies with
the characteristics of the borrower and of the loan
contract.
Very little evidence on institutional disparities in
mortgage yields exists.
Heuson (1989).

The major exception is the study by

Heuson examines the disparity in pricing of

adjustable-rate loans across commercial banks and savings
and loan associations.

The results of her study suggest
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that initial period discounts or "teasers" on adjustablerate mortgages are not identical across lender type.

Heuson

finds that commercial banks, in general, offer larger
teasers than thrift institutions.

There is no hard evidence

on whether or not failed or failing lending institutions
underprice their mortgage products.
Host of the empirical evidence on the pricing behavior
of insolvent institutions has focused on whether failed or
failing lending institutions bid up their costs of funds.
Several studies (e.g. Kane (1982,1984), Benston and Kaufman
(1986) and Kim and Santomero (1988)) suggest that insolvent
thrifts, to a large extent, are able to bid up the cost of
funds because of the fixed premium deposit insurance
system.3 Their argument is that deposit insurance gives
failed or failing lending institutions an added incentive to
bear excessive risks, which can potentially increase their
profit at the expense of the insurer and perhaps uninsured
depositors.

By taking on extremely high levels of risk,

failed or failing lending institution can in turn bid-up the
cost of funds in order to attract deposits.

All of the

3The federal insurance programs were established by the
Banking Acts in the 1930s in response to serious deterioration
in the financial market brought about by the Great Depression.
Indeed, the rationale for deposit insurance is sound. It's
based on the notion of maintaining economic efficiency. The
losses associated with failure may be expected to influence
the behavior of market participants, especially for thrift
institutions since they provide the bulk of our money supply.
Large scale failure may lead to economic depressions and can
potentially bring down the entire financial system.
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gains from this lending strategy accrue to the owners and
managers of the lending institution, while the losses accrue
to the insurer.4
Depositors under this scenario operate with a high
degree of confidence, since deposit insurance, in essence,
eliminates the risk of loss, thereby reducing the high costs
of information and surveillance associated with failed or
failing lending institutions.5 Also, because of the
protection that deposit insurance offers, depositors have no
need to withdraw funds from problem institutions, making
runs on the banking system highly unlikely (see, for
example, Kane (1983,1985) and Benton (1983)).
Deposit insurance also creates moral hazard problems,
in which lending institutions with more information than the
federally deposit insurance agencies may manage their assets
in such a way so as to increase overall risk.

It is both

implausible and potentially misleading to assume that the

*The works of Merton (1977) and Sharpe (1978) and
Brickley and James (1986) make substantial contributions.
These authors show that providing deposit guarantees at less
than their market value provides depository institutions with
a subsidy. However, Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) argue that
the explicit premium that the federal depository insurance
agencies charges is deliberately underpriced, and capital
adequacy and other regulations serve as an additional implicit
premium.
Merton (1978) shows that the surveillance cost component
of deposit insurance premium is, ineffect, paid for by the
depositor. Government guarantees for
deposits can be provided
because there exists economies of scale in information and
monitoring costs in large scale insurance to the
S&L
institutions.
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public insuring agency has the same information as the
lending institution concerning the quality of the
institution's asset, since the lending institution normally
has superior information concerning its assets.6
Furthermore, with the increasing popularity in asset
securitization activities, lending institutions can
potentially alter their riskiness by issuing mortgage-backed
securities (Pavel and Phillis (1987)).

However, there is

potential adverse selection problem due to Akerlof's (1970)
"lemons" principle where lending institutions only sell
assets with higher risks than their normally would retain
for their own portfolios (Jaffee and Rosen (1988)).
Thereby, lending institutions may potentially be able to
shift risks to the investors of mortgage-backed securities.
In addition, the failed or failing lending institution can

6A pricing policy that ignores this information asymmetry
is likely to provide depository institutions with similar
risk-taking incentives that is associated with the current
risk-insensitive pricing arrangement. Kane (1983) appreciates
this aspect of the problem.
He argues for a "redesigned"
insurance system that would provide incentives to the
institutions to truthfully reveal the necessary information
and thereby facilitate the efficient pricing of risk shifted
to the public insurer. A variety of pricing policies that
involve a thrift's choice of capital or asset/liability
composition could be designed to elicit the needed
information. Theoretically, it is a sound concept, however,
the implementation of such policies will be infeasible, as it
calls for accurately quantifying the riskiness of each insured
institution in terms of observable and realistic data. In the
absence of such quantification, the federal insurance
agencies' role would become necessarily judgmental, running
counter to the very spirit that deregulation seeks to foster.
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generate fee Income from originating mortgage loans that are
sold and by then servicing those loans.
Since the solvency status of a lending institution is
largely dependent upon its capital-to-asset ratio, which is,
in part, regulated by the depository insurance agencies, the
thrift has every incentive to improve this regulated
constraint.7 For failed or failing institutions, this
issue becomes even more critical.

Their survivability

depends not only on whether or not they can improve the
capital-to-asset ratio, but also on how fast they are able
to do it.

To become solvent again is to prevent the

regulator from closing them down.

It is these problem

thrift institutions, which are in desperate need to quickly
generate cash, that are thought to be underbidding their
products, primarily FRMs and ARMs, and bidding up their cost
of funds.

And as previously argued, most existing

literature has focussed on the later issue, none have
addressed the underpricing behavior of failed or failing
institutions.
2.3

conclusion

7The ultimate purpose of a capital adequacy is to
explicitly protect, preserve and promote the soundness of
depository institutional system. The standard is imposed, in
part, to insure that an adequate surplus exists protecting
depositors from losing their funds.
The minimum capital
requirement potentially reduces the probability of insolvency.
Theoretically, the higher the capitalization, the less risk
depositors must assume ceteris paribus.
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This chapter provides a brief review of the extant
literature on disparities on the mortgage pricing behavior
of lending institutions.

In particular, regional variation

in mortgage yields and differences in lending practices
among financial institutions are discussed.

This chapter

also briefly reviews the evidence on well-capitalized
lending institutions in the presence of federal deposit
insurance programs and whether failed or failing lending
institutions bid up their cost of funds.

The ability for

lending institutions to bid-up their cost of funds is due,
in part, to the existence of a flat-rate deposit insurance
premium.

The issue of underpricing by these failed or

failing institutions is not currently examined in the
mortgage pricing literature.

In light of this gap, this

dissertation attempts to extend the literature by examining
the issue of mortgage underpricing as it applies to failed
or failing lending institutions.

Chapter ill

Theory
Normally, a well-capitalized lender will price its
mortgage products (i.e., fixed and/or adjustable- ate
mortgages) based on the conditional probability that the
lending institution will remain solvent.

Since these

institutions have positive equity capital at risk, they will
be concerned about the various contingent claims on a
mortgage, such as prepayment and default.
Failed or failing financial institutions, however, may
not care about borrowers' defaults, especially if there is a
small chance that the institution will regain solvency
should defaults

or adverse prepayments occur.

Insolvent

institutions that will probably go under anyway may favor
risky mortgage loans over safe ones, and be tempted to
underprice their mortgage loan products to get a large
return should these mortgage loans actually pay off.
Furthermore, insolvent savings and loan institutions can
also underbid their loans by underpricing the interest rate
risks.

It is a no loss proposition for insolvent thrift

institutions to bear excessive interest rate risks.

Unlike

well-capitalized institutions, gain and loss functions for
insolvent institutions are unsymmetrical and are bounded
from below.

All of the gains from this lending strategy

accrue to the owners and managers of the lending
19
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institutions, while any additional loss is inconsequential
to the institutions given their current insolventcy
conditions.

This warped strategy for originating mortgage

loans is clearly costly to taxpayers and to the economy as a
whole.

Financial managers of failed or failing lending

institutions who act strictly in their shareholders'
interests (and against the interests of debt holders and
federal deposit insurers) may offer mortgage borrowers loans
at reduced or "below-market" interest rates.
This chapter examines the pricing implications of
fixed-and adjustable-rate mortgages originated by failed or
failing institutions.

The chapter starts out with a

contingent-claims model of fixed-rate mortgages and
illustrates the pricing implications for insolvent
institutions when the assumptions regarding the conditional
probability of remaining solvent and the intersest rate
related capital loss are relaxed.

Finally, the pricing of

adjustable-rate mortgages is discussed.
3.1
The

Pricing Practices of Failed or Failing Institutions:
Case of Fixed-Rate Mortgages.
Several implicit assumptions are conveniently

overlooked when developing pricing models of fixed-rate
mortgages.8 One such assumption is the premise that the
BContingent-claims Pricing models of fixed-rate mortgages
are developed by Dunn and McConnell (1981), Cunningham and
Hendershott (1984) and Kau, et al. (1986). For an excellent
summary of this literature, see Hendershott and Van Order
(1987).
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lending institution is solvent and will remain solvent.
Relaxing this assumption, it can be shown that failed or
failing lending institutions will have a natural incentive
to underprice their mortgage loan products.

While such a

pricing behavior is good for recipients of these low
mortgage rates, it is generally bad for other households and
well-capitalized mortgage lenders.

It is argued that

insolvent institutions may underprice their fixed-rate
mortages by either underpricing default risks and interest
rate risks.

3.1.1

Underpricing of Default risk
To illustrate the pricing behavior of failed or

failing financial institutions, consider a contingent-claims
model of fixed-rate mortgages assuming the conditional
probability of the thrift being solvent is non-negative.
Most contingent-claims pricing models of fixed-rate
mortgages implicitly assume that capital markets and the
market for real estate are perfect (see, for example, Kau,
Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1986, 1989); and Titman and
Torous (1986)).

These models also implicitly assume that

borrowers are wealth maximizers, utilizing an optimal call
strategy in deciding whether or not to terminate the
mortgage prematurely.
Most contingent-claims pricing models assume that
mortgage borrowers have two options, the option to terminate
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(i.e. either refinance or allow a buyer of the property to
assume) the mortgage at their discretion, and the option to
default.

The option to repay or assume an existing mortgage

allows borrowers to refinance if interest rates decline or
let a new buyer assume an existing low rate mortgage ("put"
it back in the lender's portfolio) if interest rates rise.
This option reduces the costs of possible future
relocation.9
Host contingent-claims pricing models also assume that
expected default losses on mortgages depend on the
likelihood of default and the expected losses associated
with its occurrence.

The argument is that a mortgage

borrower will default on the debt if the gains from doing so
(i.e., the recapture of negative equity in the house and the
free rent that can be obtained between the time of default
and actual foreclosure) exceed the direct and indirect costs
(i.e., the dollar and psychic costs of moving, loss of
attachable assets, and loss of credit rating). Under these
conditions, a solvent or well-capitalized lender may
conceivably require a slight risk premium to compensate for
aversion to these expected losses.

Furthermore, solvent or

well-capitalized lenders may also require a higher coupon

9Borrowers may also terminate the mortgage owing to such
events as the sale of the property and the move to a new home,
the changing of jobs, etc. These events are generally not of
concern to investors because such mortgage refinancing or
assumptions are unsystematic and thus are as likely to raise
investor yields as to reduce them.
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rate to offset the lower servicing value owing to greater
expected default.
These observations suggest that solvent or wellcapitalized lenders will be concerned about two sources of
uncertainty in mortgages: the term structure of interest
rates and the housing price.

To model this, let r be the

instantaneous risk-free interest rate, and H represent the
value of the house.

Also assume that the spot rate of

interest, r, follows a mean reverting square root diffusion
process:

dr = b(m-r)dt + orf r dzr

(1)

where
b

= speed of adjustment coefficient of the
current interest rate to its long run mean

m

= long-term mean for r

or = instantaneous standard deviation and
zr = standardized Wiener process

Note that the functional form of the mean reverting interest
rate stochastic process in equation (1) excludes the
possibility of negative interest rates a priori.
Further, assume that the local expectation hypothesis
of the term structure holds, and is given by:
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E[dB(t,T)]/B(t,T) - r(t)dt

(2 )

where
B(t,T) - value of a pure discount bond at time t
paying one dollar at time T
r(t) = spot rate at time t

One of the advantages in invoking the local expectation
hypothesis is that there are no risk premia in the term
structure.

Since the market price of risk is zero, there is

no need to make any assumptions about investor preferences
in determining the fundamental valuation equation.

In this

case, all riskless securities will earn the current
instantaneous riskless rate, r, which is the rate of return
over the shortest time interval, dt.

Furthermore, the local

expectation hypothesis implies that the spot rate, r(t), in
the term structure summarizes all information at time t the
lending institution needs to know about future interest
rates.

Hence, a single state variable is needed to

represent the term structure of interest rates.10 Also, it
is assumed that the variance of the process increases
proportionally with the interest rate.

10Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) discuss in depth the
local expectation hypothesis and prove that only the local
expectation hypothesis is consistent with a general
equilibrium in continuous time.
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The other source of uncertainty 1b the house price.
The value of the house, H, is assumed to follow a lognormal
diffusion process.

The expected return on the house is

composed of two parts: the service flow or expected
dividends from using the property over time and the capital
reversion on the house.

The stochastic process representing

house prices is described by the following equation:

dH = (h - s) Hdt + oH HdzH

(3)

where
h

= instantaneous expected return on house

s

= continuous rate of service flow of house

oH = instantaneous standard deviation
zH = standardized Wiener process

The service flow from the house, sHdt, is assumed to be
proportional to the house price.

The term (h~s) represents

the expected rate of equity reversion on the property and is
assumed to be lognormally distributed.
The lognormality of the distribution of housing prices
gives the mortgage model some plausible properties.

First

of all, negative house prices are excluded from the model.
Secondly, when the level of house prices increases, the
variance of the change in housing prices will also increase.
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And finally, as the house price approaches zero, so does the
market value of the mortgage.
It is also assumed that the unexpected changes in the
house value are correlated with unanticipated changes in the
instantaneous spot rate
dzr(t) dzH(t) = pdt

(4)

where p denotes the instantaneous correlation coefficient
between the changes in interest rates and the level of
housing prices.
Given these assumptions, the instantaneous level of
housing prices, the current instantaneously riskless rate of
interest, and the time to maturity completely summarize all
of the information needed to determine the price of a
mortgage.

The value of the mortgage can be obtained by

applying Ito*s lemma:11

11Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the
values of the riskless bond, the house, and the mortgage, are
all linear functions of only two state variables, a riskless
portfolio can be formed by combining these assets. It is also
assumed that the interest rate risk of the mortgage can be
hedged with a short position in the riskless bond and that the
risk associating with changes in the value of the house can be
hedged with short positions in the property. Since there is
no arbitrage opportunities, the return on the riskless
portfolio must be equal to risk free rate of interest* Using
the hedging arguments as in Black and Scholes (1973) or Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a), it is possible to determine a
fundamental partial differential equation for the value of the
mortgage.
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h a 2H2 (82V/3H2) + pH/rCThar(82V/ (8Hdr))

+ h r o f i d t y / d x 2) + b(m-r) (3v/8r)
+ (r-s)H(3v/3H) + 3v/3t - rV + r =0

(5)

Equation (5) suggests that the expected instantaneous
mortgage value is composed of two sources of value:

the

payout function describing the payment stream of the
mortgage, r, and the expected gains due to changes in time,
t, and state variables, H and r.

The

dV/dt

term in (5)

represents the change in the value of the mortgage with
respect to time.

The

b(m-r)(3v/3r) term in (5) is the

expected change in the interest rate multiplied by the
sensitivity of the mortgage value to interest rate, where
the expected value gain owing to the stochastic nature of r
is given by

h r a ^ i d ^ / d x 2).

This implies that this expected

gain in value depends on the volatility of the spot rate and
the shape of the mortgage value function.

Similarly,

(r-

s)H(3V/3H) and ^ffhzH2 (32V/3h2) represent the expected change
in mortgage value from the sensitivity to and stochastic
dispersion in housing prices.

Finally,

the term

pH/rahar(32V/(8H3r)) in the fundamental partial differential
equation is the gain in mortgage value as the result of
covariations in housing prices and interest rates.

Figure

3.1 represents the value of the mortgage at a given time as
a function of house prices.

The value of the default option

is the difference between the value of a default-free and a

defaultable mortgage.

The option is optimally exercised

along the 45°-degree line.
Proposition:

Failed or failing lending

institutions will underbid their mortgage products
by an amount equal to /x = F*(0) (1-r,) (l-F“(/5))_1
Proof.

Proof of this proposition rests on the simple

realization that failed or failing lending institutions are
not concerned with the default option by the borrower.
Since insolvent lending institutions probably will go under
anyway should borrowers default, they will instead favor
risky mortgages over safe ones.

The formal proof of this

proposition is contained in appendix A, QED.
This suggests that the state variable governing house
price dynamics is no longer needed, hence equation (5) can
be simplified to:

h o 2r(a2V/3r2) + b(m-r) (dv/dr)

+ av/at - rv + r = o

(6)

A comparison of equations (5) and (6) suggests that a
failed or failing lending institution will discount their
mortgage products by the value of the default option.

The

magnitude of this discount can easily be seen by examining
Tables 3.1-3.4.

Table 3.1 shows the value of a fixed-rate

mortgage with default and prepayment options at various
loan-to-value and volatility ratios, while Table 3.2 shows
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the value of a default-free fixed-rate mortgage.

These

figures were generated assuming:
n * 180
H(0) - 100
r(0)

•

m -

H
o

.10

b - .25
e

=

0

s

—

.05

with appropriate boundary and initial conditions, (see
appendix B for more details) and are identical to those
reported in Kau, et al. (1986).

The differences between the

value of a mortgage with default and prepayment option and
the value of a non-defaultable mortgage are reported in
Table 3.

Table 4 gives the value of the default options in

term of basis points which vary significantly between 0 to
320 basis points.

Failed or failing may, therefore,

underbid their mortgages since they do not account for
default risk in pricing mortgage loans.
In addition to underpricing of borrowers' default,
insolvent institutions may also underbid their fixed-rate
mortgages by underpricing interest rate risks.

3.1.2

Underpricing of Interest Rate Risk

Unlike well-capitalized lending institutions, insolvent
savings and loan associations have unsymmetrical boundary

conditions in the gain and loss functions.

All of the gains

from bearing excessive interest rate risks accrue to the
mortgage lenders while all additional losses are
inconsequential to already insolvent thrifts.

Since the

insolvent institutions do not account for loss due to
interest rate risks in pricing mortgage loans, they, in turn
will price their mortgage products at a discount relative to
solvent thrift institutions.
Considering a one-state variable of the value of a
mortgage as given by the following equation

W r2r(82V/8r2) + b(m-r) (8v/8r)
+ 8V/8t - rV + r * 0

(7)

The first two terms represent the capital gains and
loss from the mortgage owning to undeterministic shifts in
term structure interest rates.

For an insolvent institution

an upward shift in the term structure of interest is of no
consequence because the institution is already insolvent.
Any additional capital losses will have no effect on their
already underwater financial condition.

Since an insolvent

thrift's capital loss is of no additional consequence to
it's financial status, the institution will, in turn, not
take into account this added loss in the pricing of its
mortgages.

The pricing equation therefore becomes
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av/at - rv + r - o

(8)

On the contrary, all capital gains from an downward
shift In the term structure will fully accrue to the
insolvent institutions.

Hence the pricing equation, should

include the capital gain terms and is represented by

horlr{d2V/Bi?) + b(m-r) OV/3r)

+ av/at - rV + r - 0

(9)

In light of the unsymmetrical nature of the gain and
loss funtions, insolvent thrift institutions are able to
originate fixed-rate mortgages at a discount relative to
healthy institutions.

The amount this underpricing is as

high as 177 basis points and is reported in table 3.5 for a
$100,000, 30 years fixed rate loan.

Therefore, in addition

to underpricing the default risks, insolvent institutions
may also underprice the interest rate risks.

Using the same

analogy, the underpricing of mortgages by insolvent thrift
institutions can be extended to the pricing of adjustablerate mortgages.

3.2

Pricing Practices of Failed or Failing Institutions:

The

Case of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) are widely issued by
traditional mortgage portfolio investors.

AKMs carry an

interest rate which can adjust during the life of the loan,
and is usually tied to some financial index, such as the
rate on the 6-month treasury-bills or 1-year treasury notes;
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average contract
rate; or the average cost of funds for federally-insured
savings and loan associations.

Host of the originated ARMs

either have life-of-loan caps and/or periodic-rate cap and
no pure ARMs actually exist.
The market value of an ARM depends upon the contractual
variation, the characteristics of the index rate, prepayment
behavior, current and future interest rate and the
probability of default.

The contractual variations of an

ARM include the index choice, the margin, the frequency of
adjustment, the caps and the teaser rate.

Each of these

variations can affect the rate of an ARM.

It is these

contractual variations that further complicate the valuation
of the adjustable-rate mortgage.

The current literature on

ARMs includes Asay(1984), Buser, Hendershott and Sanders
(1985), Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1989).

Asay uses

a forward-pricing approach while Buser, Hendershott and
Sanders and Kau, et al use a backward approach.

The Asay's

model does not actually price a true adjustable-rate
mortgage because neither yearly caps nor prepayment are
included.

Buser, Hendershott and Sanders employ numerical

procedures to analyze the sensitivity of the value of lifeof-loan rate caps to variations in the term structure of
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interest rates.

They find that the value of the cap depends

importantly on both the slope of the term structure of
interest rates and the variance of the one-month rate.

Kau

and associates also use a backward approach to analyze ARMs.
By introducing an auxiliary state variable, they are able to
provide a solution to the problem of path dependency of the
current contract rate.
Using a similar analogy as presented in the case of
fixed-rate mortgages, it follows that failed or failing
lending institutions also have a natural incentive to
underprice ARMs.

Insolvent thrift institutions can offer

adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount by underpricing the
default risks and the interest rate risks as discussed
previously for the case of fixed-rate mortgages.

Firstly,

since these institutions may not be around in future
periods, should borrowers default, they may not be concerned
with the default option on ARMs.

Secondly, these insolvent

institutions may also underprice the interest rate risks due
to the unsymmetrical nature of their pricing equations as
discussed in the fixed rate case.

However, unlike fixed

rate loans, adjustable-rate mortgages allow lenders to
adjust for any adverse shifts in the term structure of
interest rates conditional upon the size of the interest
rate caps.
For an upward shift in interest rate the lender incurs
a capital loss if and only if changes in the mortgage
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interest rate is larger than the allowable adjustment level
of the caps.

Since insolvent thrift institutions may not be

concerned with losses due to changes in the term structure
as argued earlier, their pricing equations for an ARM
subject only to a life-of-loan interest rate cap now
becomes:

ho*r(dzV/dj?) + b(m-r) (dv/dr)

+ dv/dt - rV + r = 0

if r < c

av/at - r v + r - o

if r > c

where c is the life-of-loan rate cap on the adjustable-rate
mortgage.

Table 3.6 shows the amount of underpricing to be

between 30 to 52 basis points dependent upon the level of
interest rate caps.

This implies that failed or failing

lending institutions can lower the price of ARMs either by
charging a lower margin, less discount points, and/or
offering tighter cap.

Any one of these options or any

combination thereof will make the borrower better off and,
as a consequence, more likely to choose an ARM from failed
or failing lending institutions
3.3

conclusion

This chapter shows that failed or failing institutions
may price their fixed-rate mortgage loan products at a lower
rate than well-capitalized lending institutions.

The model

is based on the premise that well-capitalized lending
institutions will worry about the conditional probability
that the institution will remain solvent when pricing their
mortgage products.

On the other hand, failed or failing

lending institutions that may have only a small chance of
regaining solvency in the future period will not care about
borrower defaults.

In addition to underpricing borrower

defaults, insolvent institutions can also underprice the
interest rate risks.

Their abilities to do so are largely

due to the unsymmetrical nature of their capital gain and
loss functions.

Therefore, these insolvent institutions can

underprice their loan products by offering fixed-rate
mortgages at a discount relative to the healthy lending
institutions.
The same argument can also be made for adjustable-rate
mortgages.

Insolvent institutions may offer adjustable-rate

mortgages at a discount in order to encourage or allow
continue borrowing.

Moreover, because ASM borrowers are

better off with lower points, tighter caps, or greater
teaser rates, failed or failing lending institutions may
offer adjustable-rate mortgages with fairly large teaser
rates, tighter interest-rate caps, or lower discount points.
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DEFAULT-FREE FRM

HOUSE VALUE

FIGURE 3 . I . RELATIONSHIP B E T W E E N VA LU E OF A
D EFA U LTA B LE FRM AND HOUSE PRICE

Table 3.1

Value of Mortgage with Default and Prepayment ($)

LTV

.05

.10

.15

.80

.05
.10
.15

78,799
78,799
78,799

78,744
78,768
78,777

78,282
78,457
78,564

.85

.05
.10
.15

83,720
83,723
83,722

83,563
83,614
83,648

82,749
83,015
83,184

.90

.05
.10
.15

88,619
88,628
88,633

88,214
88,325
88,408

86,956
87,232
87,516

.95

.05
.10
.15

93,403
93,442
93,457

92,481
92,738
92,895

90,811
91,067
91,287

1.00

.05
.10
.15

97,704
97,911
98,064

96,038
96,189
96,392

94,074
94,481
94,726

Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.2

Value of Mortgage without Default ($)

in
•

.10

H

in
o•

LTV

.80

.05
.10
.15

78,800
78,800
78,801

78,832
78,857
78,880

78,993
79,208
79,325

.85

.05
.10
.15

83,728
83,732
83,736

83,832
83,925
83,977

84,055
85,594
85,053

.90

.05
.10
.15

88,685
88,716
88,734

88,962
89,382
89,618

89,216
90,220
91,465

in
a•

.05
.10
.15

93,884
94,258
94,675

94,144
95,561
97,067

94,517
96,314
98,196

1.00

.05
.10
.15

99,220
103,091
110,969

99,746
102,133
105,743

99,657
103,004
107,041

Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.3

Value of The Default Option ($}

LTV

.05

.10

.15

.80

.05
.10
.15

1
1
2

88
89
103

711
751
761

.85

.05
.10
.15

8
9
14

269
315
329

1306
1579
1869

.90

.05
.10
.15

66
88
101

748
1057
1210

2260
2988
3949

.95

.05
.10
.15

481
817
1218

1663
2823
4172

3760
5247
6909

1.00

.05
.10
.15

1516
5180
12905

3708
5944
9342

5583
8523
12315

Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.4

Values of Default with Changes in Variances
and Loan to Value Ratio
(basis points)
LTV

.05

.10

.15

.80

.05
.10
.15

.03
.03
.05

2.29
2.31
2.6

18.49
19.53
19.79

.85

.05
.10
.15

.21
.23
.36

6.99
8.19
8.55

33.96
41.05
48.59

.90

.05
.10
.15

1.72
2.29
2.63

19.45
27.48
31.46

58.76
77.69
102.67

.95

.05
.10
.15

12.51
21.24
31.67

43.24
73.40
108.47

96.36
136.42
179.63

1.00

.05
.10
.15

39.42
134.68
335.53

96.41
154.54
242.89

145.16
221.6
320.19

Source: Kau, et al. (1986)

41

Table 3.5
Value of Fixed-Rate Mortgages for Solvent
and Insolvent Institutions and the interest
Rate Risk Premium at Difference Mean Reversion Coefficient (b)

value of interest
rate risk premium
in basis points

b

0.06
0.12
0.18
0.24
0.36
0.40
0.50
0.75

Source:

3698
5835
6538
6814
6800
6693
6249
5084

Kau and Associates (1989)

96.15
151.71
170.00
177.16
176.80
174.02
162.47
132.18
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Table 3.6
Value of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages for Solvent
and Insolvent Institutions and the Interest
Rate Risk Premium on a $100,000 Loan

value of interest
rate risk premium
in basis points

annual,
life-of-loan caps

(1%,5%)
(2%,5%)
(«,5%)
(l%,oo)
(2%,oo)
(00,00)

Source:

2004
1460
1238
2011
1437
1161

Kau and Associates (1989)

52.10
37.19
32.19
52.19
37.36
30.19

Chapter zv
Empirical Methodology

This chapter describes three estimation techniques
designed to test whether failed or failing institutions
underprice their mortgage loan products.

Structural changes

in the pricing of mortgages can occur whenever the
parameters of the mortgage pricing model systematically
change values over the data space.

One way to test for

these changes is to use the general switching regression
model, as developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1976).

A second

approach is to use the Chow test (1960) and a third approach
is the Tishler and Zang (1979) technique.

4.1.

Background
Suppose that there are two possible mortgage pricing

regimes, one followed by solvent lending institutions and
another followed by failed or failing lending institutions.
Let the two mortgage pricing regimes be described as
follows:

y, = x, /3, + cn ,

i « I,

where It is an index representing solvent or wellcapitalized lending institutions, and
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(l)
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Y| ~ X,

P2

i e I2

+ €f2

(2 )

where I2 is an index representing failed or failing lending
institutions.

Equations (1) and (2) explain how the lender

groups go about setting the interest rates on their mortgage
loans in response to various exogenous or predetermined
factors.

In this notation, y, represents the interest rate

corresponding to the ith mortgage loan, x, is a vector of
principal co-variates, /3, and

(£, * 02) are coefficient

vectors to be estimated, and cn and ei2 are residuals which
are assumed to be independently identically distributed as
normal functions with mean 0 and standard deviation a.
Models similar to (1) and (2) have been used in a
variety of contexts.

One of the earliest applications of

the switching regression model is by Hammermesh (1970).
Hammermesh, in examining the negotiated wage rate for
industrial firms, posited a two regime model in which the
negotiated wage rate for the ift firm depending on the
inverse of the unemployment rate and the annual percentage
change in the consumer price index.

He assumes that there

is a threshold effect hence he posits two-regimes switching
model,

silber (1974) has also used the switching regression

model to explain the spread between interest rates on
federal agency securities.

His model suggests that the

spread between yields on agency securities and Treasuries
depends on the size of the agency issue, with large issues
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being priced one way and small issues being priced another
way.

Other regression applications of switching model can

be found in Fair and Jaffee (1972), Goldfeld (1976) and
Tishler and Zang (1979).

4.2. The Chow Test

One way to test for equality of the set of coefficients
in equations (1) and (2) is described in Chow (1960).

A

formal statement of the Chow test can be postulated by
rewriting equations (1) and (2) as

y, *

+ e

(3)

where e is an error term assumed to be normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance a2. The null hypothesis for the
Chow test is

V

*1 ^ 02

where 0, *= (0U , ..., 01k) ' from equation (1) and 02 = (021,
..., 02k) 1, from equation (2).

The test statistic is

(QrQjO/k
F(k, n,+n2-2k)
Q2/(n1+n2-2k)

(4)
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where
n{ - sample size in regime i (i«=l,2)
Q1 = Y'[I - X(X'X) '1X' ]Y, the constrained sum of
squared residuals, and
Q2 = y,'[I
where y( (i=l,2) is the dependent variable in regime i, and
x, (i=l,2) is a n, x k matrix of observations on the
explanatory variables in regime i.

A significant F-

statistic implies structural shift between regimes.

4.3

Goldfeld and Quandt Test
The Goldfeld and Quandt test allows the log-1ikelihood

function to be maximized directly by replacing a dichotomic
variable with a continuous differentiable approximation.
For the general formulation of (1) and (2), if the
dichotomic variable, D{, is defined as:

0

if r, e I1

D, = D(rf) - {

(5)
1

if r, e I2

where r, is an exogenously observable variable with a
certain threshold value to separate the observations between
and I2. The two regimes equation (1) and (2) can be
combined with (5) to yield:
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yf - (1 - Dj)x(/?j + D,xf/82 + C|

where

(6)

e, * (1 - IV en +

The log-1ikelihood function, L, of the model Is:

L(a) = constant - ^Ln(fi)

-h[y - (I - DJX,^ - DX2j82]'

n'1 [y - (I - D)V, - DX202]

where

a is the vector of parameters toestimate and n

(7)

■ (I

- D)2 a12+ D2a22 is the covariance matrix of c.
Because the log-1ikelihood function in (8) cannot be
maximized directly due to the discontinuity in Df, it is not
possible to obtain the necessary derivatives needed for
optimization procedures.

The solution to this problem is to

replace the step function D4 by a continuous and
differentiable approximation function.

Goldfeld and Quandt

(1976) suggest that the normal distribution function be used
as an approximation of D,. It is diagrammatically presented
in figure 4.1.

Thus, D(r,) can be written as:
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D(r,)

= J r ( l / « x / ( 2 ir))

exp[-(% )((«

- / i ) / a ) z]d€

(8 )

where £ is N(o, a2)

4.4

Tishler and Zang Test

Tishler and Zang (1979) test for structural differences
across two equations is analogous to Goldfeld and Quandt
(1976), except that Tishler and Zang propose a polynomial
function as an approximation for Df. The Tishler and Zang
test is presented in figure 4.2 and can be written as:

0 if r, < -c
k
D(r,) = ( 2 b,r{ if -c s r, i c
i=0
1

(9)

if r, > c

where k and b, represent the degree and the coefficients of
a polynomial respectively.
For a value of k = 3, the specification of D( becomes:
0

if r, <-c
1

3

D(rf) = {--- +
2
1

1
r, - ----4c
4c3

rf if -c<r,<c (10)
if r, >c

The major difference

between GoldfeldandQuandtand

Tishler and Zang tests occurs when the exogenous variable r,
lies between -c and c.

Where c is a parameter whose value

can be chosen to be arbitrarily small.

The problem with
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Tishler and Zang is the choice of the optimal value for c.
They do not solve this problem.

These estimation techniques

as proposed by Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt, and Tishler and
Zang are used to examine the pricing of mortgages by
insolvent institutions.

4.5

Conclusions
This chapter presents three estimation techniques to

test whether failed or failing institutions systematically
underbid their mortgage loans.

Switching models are

appropriate because the shift in parameter values from
solvent to insolvent regimes is a reflection of a structural
change,

in particular, the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt,

and the Tishler and Zang estimation techniques are
described.

These three approaches will be used to test for

the underpricing of fixed-and adjustable-rate mortgages.

so

D( r , )

1/2

FIGURE 4 . 1 .
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Chapter ▼
Model Specifications and Empirical Results
The case of Fixed-Rate Mortgages

This chapter applies the three estimation techniques
described in the previous chapter to the pricing of FixedRate Mortgages (FRMs). The chapter starts out with the
pricing estimation of FRMs, and finally, empirical results
are presented.

5.1

The Pricing of Fixed Rate Mortgages.

The conventional fixed-rate mortgage is the most common
type of real estate financing instrument.

Fixed-rate

mortgages have an interest rate and monthly payment which
remain constant over the life of the loan.
interest paid and principal are limited.

The amount of
Fixed rate loans

typically have maturities of thirty years.

Shorter term

FRMs of fifteen years are also offered by thrifts to reduce
the imbalance in their asset/liability mix.
The fixed-rate mortgage, as simple as it may seem, is a
complex contract with many covenants that legally bind the
lender and the borrower.

The fixed-rate mortgage is

characterized by the way in which interest payments are
determined and the borrower's options to prematurely
terminate the contract.

Perhaps, the most important
52
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provisions in a fixed-rate mortgage are the right to repay
and the right to default the loan.

These contractual

provisions affect the value of the mortgage analogous to the
manner that bond covenants affect the market value of a
bond.

It is argued that insolvent institutions do not

consider the borrower's option to default in pricing their
loans.

And, since the put option is showed to have positive

impact on the value of the mortgage, a failed or failing
institution can underprice the mortgage as compared to the
way in which a solvent Institution would price the identical
loan.

Furthermore, it is argued that insolvent thrifts may

not consider capital losses associated with adverse changes
in interest rates.

These institutions, therefore, may offer

fixed rate loans at a discount as compared to solvent
institutions.

This implies that the financial condition of

the lender should affect the offered rate on the mortgage.
The inclusion of lender characteristics has not been
examined in the mortgage pricing literature.
Empirical studies, such as Lea (1985), Campbell and
Dietrich (1984), Sirmans and Benjamin (1988), and Sa-Aadu
and Sirmans (1987) have shown that there is a statistically
significant direct relationship between the initial loan-tovalue ratio of a mortgage and the mortgage rate.

The lower

is the required equity, the larger are the payments which,
in turn, increases the likelihood that a borrower will not
be able to meet the payment obligations and thereby
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increases -the probability of default.

This implies a

positive relationship between the contract rate and the
loan-to-value ratio.

Furthermore, a higher loan-to-value

ratio, ceteris paribus. means a lower required equity.

A

lower equity means that the value of the house does not have
to fall much before the default put option to be 'in the
money'.

Thus, default is more likely to occur.

In addition to these variables, the theory also
suggests that the institutional aspects of the thrift will
also affect the value of mortgages.

In particular, the

theory posits that there is a loan pricing differential
between solvent and failed or failing savings and loan
associations.

In pricing their loans, insolvent

institutions will systematically underprice the mortgage.
The shakier the institution, the lower the mortgage rate it
changes.
Finally, as in previously mentioned empirical studies,
the amount of the loan will also affect the mortgage.

The

larger the mortgage, the lower the rate tends to be.

This

is largely due to economies of scale in loan servicing.

In

light of this, the following model is formed for fixed-rate
mortgages:

ERATE = b0 + b, LOG (LTV) + b2 LOG (A) + b3 REGKTL

(1)
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where
ERATE * the effective rate
LTV = the loan-to-value ratio
A * the loan amount
REGKTL «= the capital-to-asset ratio

Furthermore, the pricing differential between solvent
and insolvent also implies that there is a structural shift
in the pricing model.

This shift in parameter values from

the 'solvent* regime to the 'insolvent* regime can be
specified by the following model:

Erate, - 0O1 + j0nLOG (LTV,) + £2,LOG (A,) + e, (if REGKTL<0) (2)

Erate, = 0OZ + J812L0G (LTV,) + jS22LOG (A,) + c2 (if REGKTL>0) (3)

5.1.1

The Chow Test
In estimating (13) and (14) the Chow test can be

calculated according to
(Q,-Qz)/K
F(k, n, + n2 - 2k) - ------=--------Q2/(n1+n2-2k)

m

where the constrained sum of squared errors of the model (2)
and (3) and Q2 is the unconstrained sum of squared errors
for both regimes.

A significant F-value implies a

structural change in regression equation; that is, one or
more regression coefficient change.
5.1.2

The Goldfeld and Quandt Estimation Technique

The model can be written as:

Erate, ■* [1 - D, ]{0O1 +

LOG (LTV,)

+

+ <J80z + 012 1/3(3 <LTVi>022 ™>G
+ €,<1-0,) + e2

021 LOG (A,)}
(Ai))D.
(5)

The Log-1ikelihood function becomes:

LOG L = (n/2) LOG (2*) - h E LOG [0]
- h Z {Erate, - [£01 + /3„L0G (LTV,)
+ 021 LOG (A,)](1 - D,) - [0O2+

012 LOG (LTV,)

+ JS22 LOG (A,)]D,)n‘1

The log-likelihood functions for the FRM
maximized directly.

(6)

cannot be

This is because of the discontinuous

D,. To resolve this problem, Goldfeld and Quandt suggest
the normal distribution function as a replacement for the
step function D, where as D, becomes a continuous and
differentiable function

D, (regKTL) =

(1/(V(2ir)a)) exp[-£2/(2o2))d€

(7)
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where $ is a normal random variable with mean zero, and
variance a2.
The maximization of the log-likelihood function for the
FRMs should give the maximum likelihood estimation for
parameters

5.1.3

0Q2,

02,, and 022.

The Tishler and Zang Estimation Method

Again the model of (13) and (14) can be rewritten as

Erate, - [1 - D, ]{0O, + /?„ LOG (LTV,) + 02} LOG (A,)}
+ (002 + 012 LOG (LTV,) + 0n LOG (A,) }D,
+ €,(1-0,) + €2

The Log-likelihood function becomes:

LOG L = (n/2) LOG (2jt) - \ Z LOG [«]
- h s (Erate, - [0O, + jS„LOG (LTV,)
+ 021 IXJG (A,))(l - D,) - [0O2 + 0,2LOG (LTV,)
+ 022 LOG (A,) ]D, JO'1

Tishler and Zang suggest the following polynomial
function as a replacement for the step function D, where as
D, becomes a continuous and differentiable function:
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0 if r, -c
k
D(r,) ■ { £ b.r! if -c S r, S c
i=0
1 if r, c
where k and b, represent the degree and the coefficients of
a polynomial respectively.
One specific form D{ becomes:

0
1
D(r,) = {--- +
2
1

if r, < -c
3

1
rf 4c

r|

if -c < r, < c

4c3
if r, > c

The maximization of L gives the maximum likelihood
estimation for parameters 0O1, 0O2,

012, 021, 022 for FRMs.

5.2 Data Description
Cross sectional data are used in this dissertation to
test whether or not insolvent savings and loan institutions
underprice their conventional mortgages.

These data are

obtained from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The
FHLBB collects data from all major lenders including savings
and loan associations, commerical banks and mortgage
bankers.

The data are actual conventional loans closed and

issued in the first five working days of each month which
are obtained by the FHLBB monthly mortgage interest rate
survey.

The loans include both fixed and adjustable rate

loans on single family residential properties.

The majority
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of loans are fully amortizing, first mortgages on
properties, and are mostly permanent loans.
The FHLB data provide information on important
characteristics of individual loans including fees charged
up front, contract interest rate, the term to maturity, the
mortgage loan amount, the loan-to-value ratio and the type
of originator.

The effective interest rate is also reported

in the survey based on loans amortized over ten years.

In

addition to the mortgage interest rate survey data,
financial data on all thrift institutions are collected from
section C of the FHLBB Thrift Financial Reports.

These

institutional specific data include financial characterics
(e.g., modified equity capital) of individual originators.
The data to be used in this dissertation cover the
period from May 1987 through July 1987.

Table 5.1 and 5.2

report the descriptive statistics about the entire data set.
There are over fifteen thousand fixed rate mortgages
originated by all thrift institutions for the period.

The

ratio of fixed rate loans issued by solvent as compared to
insolvent lenders is approximately 10 to l.

The

distribution of loans by various states is reported in table
5.2.

The largest number of fixed rate as well as adjustable

rate loans are originated in the state of California.
The entire sample of fixed-rate mortgages is further
restricted to only states which have more than 50
observations.

This subset of the data is used to test
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whether or not insolvent thrift institutions underprice
their fixed-rate mortgages.
The difference in means for the effective interest
rates on fixed rate loans orginated by solvent and insolvent
institutions are also tested.

The t-test tests the

hypothesis that the true means of two groups are the same.
The results of the mean tests are reported in Table 5.3 and
5.4.

Table 5.3 gives the aggregated mean test whereas Table

5.4 represents mean tests for individual states.

Overall,

there is a statistically significant underpricing of
conventional fixed-rate mortgages by insolvent thrift
institutions.

The differences in the pricing of these loans

are further examined in the following section.

5.3 Empirical Results and Discussions
This section attempts to demonstrate empirically that
insolvent savings and loans institution will systematically
underprice their fixed-rate mortgages.

The underpricing

hypothesis is tested using the previously discussed methods
namely the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and
Zang tests.

The results are consistent with the theory;

that is, in general, failed or failing saving and loan
associations appear to be underpricing their fixed rate
loans.

The magnitude of the underpricing is well within the

theoretically simulated value.
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The Chow test rejects the hypothesis of no structural
shift between the solvent and the Insolvent saving and loans
institutions.

The Chow-statistics is 7.18 implying

structural difference in pricing regimes between two sets of
institutions.

The differences in the pricing of mortgages

are also reinforced by the maximum likelihood estimation
tests of Goldfeld and Quandt and Tishler and Zang.

These

tests result in a 2*log(likelihood) ratios of 139.66 and
77.24 respectively, which also imply a significant deviation
between solvent and insolvent institutions in the pricing of
fixed-rate mortgages.

The switched point and variance of

the Goldfeld and Quandt test are -1.00 and 0.657.

Its

confidence interval at 95% level is [-2.589, 0.589].

For

the Tishler and Zang technique the results are -0.395 and
0.660 respectively.

At 95% level, the confidence interval

is [-0.020, 1.230].
The results of the maximization techniques are reported
in Table 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17.

Table 5.17 gives the

constrained model estimation where variable coefficients are
restricted to be identical across the two sets of saving and
loan institutions.

The Tishler and Zang and the Goldfeld

and Quandt are done without using any dummy variables due to
the ever-present converging difficulties of the maximum
likelihood estimation.
The regression results are presented in Table 5.5 to
5.8.The subscript

i = 1,2 represents solvent and insolvent
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institutions respectively.

The signs of most of the

coefficients are statistically significant and are as
expected.
In addition to the intercept, the log of the loan to
value ratio, and the log of the amount, these models also
include several dummy variables representing the states.
These additional dummy variables controls for regional
differential in default risks.12

In addition to testing

for structural differences in pricing equation, individual
tests between pairs of coefficients are also performed.
These tests are done for different ranges of switched
points.

These results are presented in Tables 5.9 to 5.11

and are also consistent with the theory.

The statistical

significance of the 01d and 0M are of primary interests.

/9M

is the coefficient of differences in the intercept of
insolvent and solvent saving and loan institutions.
the intercept has a positive coefficient and

Since

represents

the coefficient differences of the intercept of the
insolvent pricing equation from the solvent equation.
negative value of

A

therefore, implies that insolvent

saving and loans institutions underprice their fixed-rate
mortgages.

The magnitude of this coefficient further

implies that insolvent saving and loan associations offer

12 Weighted Least squares are also used to check the
results. There are no significant differences in results.
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their fixed-rate mortgages at 156.51 basis points lower than
solvent institutions.
The other important parameter is the log of the loanto-value ratio.

Since loan to value ratio represents the

default risk and its coefficient is positive, a negative
value of the difference in the coefficient of the LOG(LTV)
parameter also implies that insolvent institutions charge
less for the default risk than solvent institutions.

This

result is also consistent with the theory.
In light of these empirical results, it is concluded
that insolvent savings and loans do indeed underprice their
fixed-rate mortgage as suggested by the theory.

5.4 Conclusions
The primary purpose this chapter is to demonstrate
empirically whether or not insolvent saving and loan
institutions offer their fixed rate loans at a discount
relative to solvent institutions.

The result of the Chow

test and the Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and Zang
maximum likelihood estimation techniques are consistent with
the theory of underpricing by insolvent institutions.
Indeed, these institutions do offer mortgage loans at a
discount relative to healthy institutions.
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Table 5.1

Effective Rates on Fixed-Rate Mortgages
Made Between May and July, 1987

Date

number
of Loans

Means

Variance

Range

Solvent Institutions
May 1987

4879

9.554

.437

6.48-13.09

June 1987

5306

9.856

.622

6-13.78

July 1987

3762

10.135

.869

6-16.55

May-July 1987

13947

9.825

.676

6-16.5

Insolvent Institutions
May 1987

489

9.338

.305

7.3-11.78

June 1987

564

9.668

.596

7.3-11.92

July 1987

333

10.275

.707

7.3-11.77

1386

9.697

.645

7.3-11.92

15333

9.814

.674

6.-16.55

May-July 1987
All Institutions
May-July 1987
July 1987

4095

10.146

.857

6-16.55

June 1987

5870

9.838

.622

6-13.78

May 1987

5368

9.534

.429

6.48-13.09
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Table 5.2

Sample Distribution of ARMs and FRMs by States
For the period between May and July 1987

States

ARMs

FRMs

CA

6495
(18.79)*

2090
(6.05)

FL

15
(4.59)

1309
(3.79)

IL

595
(1.72)

1389
(4.02)

MI

215
(.62)

1979
(5.73)

NJ

718
(2.08)

893
(2.58)

NY

1243
(3.60)

849
(2.46)

OH

504
(1.46)

1867
(5.40)

* As the percentage of ARMs originated in all state.
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Table 5.3

Difference in effective rates
between Fixed-Rates Mortgages orginated by solvent
and insolvent thrift institutions
for all states for May-July 1987

Solvent Thrifts

Insolvent Thrifts

Mean

9.819

9.672

variance

0.672

0.639

range

6.00-16.55

7.30-11.92

N

13609

1290

Difference in means test
(t-statistics)

0.147
(6.28)*

* Indicates significance at the 0.05 level
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Mbl s 3.4
Diffsranea in affactive ratal batman Fixad-rata mortgages
originated by solvent and imolvant thrift institution!
for various statai for May-July 1987

Stata
AL
AZ
CA
CO
FL
6A
IA
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MD
MI
MO
MS
NC
NJ
OH
PA
SC
IN
TX
VA
HA
HI

SoLvant Thrift
(Number of Loans)
0.590
(150)
0.965
(159)
0.827
(1716)
0.552
(137)
9.608
(1084)
9.660
(315)
0.609
(12*)
9.699
(1201)
9.904
(311)
9.760
(294)
9.768
(126)
9.943
(51)
0.701
(220)
10.120
(1600)
9.807
(321)
10.150
(70)
0.060
(206)
0.868
(760)
9.736
(1658)
9.631
(676)
9.973
(182)
0.916
(180)
9.291
(322)
10.007
(176)
10.101
(58)
0.577
(247)

* indicats signifleant at 0.05 laval

Insolvant Thrift
(Number of Loans)
0.503
(113)
10.373
(10)
0.721
(46)
9.705
(13)
0.643
(32)
0.852
(25)
0.544
(13)
9.430
(37)
9.785
(34)
0.400
(10)
0.754
(27)
9.815
(50)
8.004
(80)
10.271
(67)
0.328
(42)
9.376
(8)
0.408
(124)
0.043
(42)
0.850
(58)
0.604
(47)
0.760
(43)
0.012
(17)
9.817
(143)
9.619
(125)
10.005
(10)
10.820
(7)

Diffaranea in naans
(t-statlsties)
-0.003
(-0.04)
-0.408
(-1.70)
0.106
(0.80)
-0.243
(-1.21)
0.165
(1.41)
-0.192
(1.23)
0.065
(0.20)
0.269
(2.92)*
0.110
(1.10)
0.360
(2.29)*
0.014
(0.06)
0.126
(0.80)
0.707
(6.88)*
-0.151
(-1.47)
0.479
(5.50)*
0.783
(3.70)*
0.462
(6.10)*
-0.075
(-0.71)
-0.114
(-1.37)
0.027
(0.27)
0.213
(1.75)
0.004
(0.02)
-0.526
(-6.04)
0.388
(4,82)*
0.186
(0.88)
-1.252
(-3.32)
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Tabla S.9
Eatimatad Raaulta for Flxad-Rata Mortsacaa
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 1867
(Unraatrlctad Modal)

lEratai - 0oi+ 0n LOGLTV + 021 LOO(A) + 03iSAL + 04iSAZ + 03J.SCA + 0eiSCO + 071SCI
+ 081SFL + /SgiSOA + 0ioiSHI + 0niSXA + 0121SIL + 013iSIN + 0i4iSKS + 015iSKY + 0ieiSLA + 6l71
SMA+ flieiSMD + 0191SMI + 02O1SMO + 0211SMS + 0221SNC + 0231*** * 0 U & M * 0251SNT + 0261SOH +
027isPA + 0281SSC + d29i8TN + 03O1STX + 03H&VA + 032iSWI
(1-1)
Paramatara
Eatimataa

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

001(CONSTANT)

12.0609
(70.07)

017l(SMA)

-0.0223
(-0.28)

011(LOGLTV)

0.0656
(2.59)

018l(SM»

-0.2386
(-2.79)

021(LOG(A))

-.211*
(-15.*1)

0191(SHI>

0.0622
(1.19)

031(SAL)

-0.401*
(-*.37)

02O1(SHO)

-0.2167
(-2.72)

041(SA2)

-0.0201
(-0.2)

02h (SMS)

0.11*2
(0.99)

051(SCA)

-0.058*
(-0.8*)

0221(SNC)

-0.0*98
(-0.58)

061(SCO)

-0.4217
(-*.**)

0231(SNE)

-0.2*61
(-2.16)

071(SCT)

-0.0658
(-0.66)

024l(SHJ)

-0.0*66
(-0.6*)

061(SFL)

-0.2066
(-2.93)

0251<SNY)

-0.1*66
(-1.83)

091(SGA)

-0.3131
(-3.91)

0261(SOH)

-0.2987
(-4.32)

01O1(SHI)

0.0772
(0.83)

0271(SPA)

-0.391*
(-5.36)

011l(SIA)

-0.4669
(-4.79)

026l(SSC)

-0.0322
(-0.36)

0121(SIL>

-0.3039
(-*.33)

029i(STH)

0131(SIN)

-0.1607
(-2 .00)

03O1(SIX)

-0.71*2
(-8.95)

0141(SKS)

-0.2*89
(-3.06)

031KSVA)

0.0534
(0.60)

0151<SKY>

-0.2606
(-2.69)

0321(SWI)

-0.4765
(-5.71)

016l(SLA)

-0.04*3
(-0.34)

Chow-STATISTICS

r,

R2
n

Varlabla
Coaffielwnta

-0.102*
(-1.15)

7.18
27.38
0.061
13809
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Tablm 5.6
Eatimatad Raaulta for Flxad-Rata Mortgagee
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 19B7
(Unraatrlctad Modal)
[ E r a t o i - 0 P i + diiLO G L T V + 0 2 i LOG(A) + £31 SAL + 0 « iS A Z + 0 S iS C A + 0 6 iS C O + 0 7 iS C T + 0 e i S F L
+ 0 9 iS G A + d io i S H I + 0 H i S I A + 0 i 2 i S J L + 0 i 3 i S I H + 0 m S K S + 0 i5 iS K )f + 01B iS L A + 0 l + 0 l 8 i S M D +
0191SM I + 02O1SMO + 0 2 u S M S + 0221SN C + 0231SN E + 0 2 1 1 S N J + 02S1SHY + 0261SO H + 0 2 7 iS P A + 0 2 e i
SSC + 02B iST H + fla o iS T X + 0 3 H S V A + 0321SW I

(1-2)
Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

002(CONSTANT)

10.195B
(16.B2)

0172(SMA)

1.0113
(1.36)

012(LOGLTV)

0.0162
(0.19)

0182(SMD)

-1.1716
(-6.SO)

022 (LOG(A))

-0.0557
(-1.16)

0192(SMI)

0.1789
(0.97)

032(SAL)

-0.1B3B
(-2.78)

02O2(SMO>

0.7521
(-3.81)

0 « (SAB)

0.3102
(1.09)

0212(SMS)

-0.6871
(-2 .22)

052(SCA)

-0.3273
(-1.69)

0222(SHC)

-0.5711
(-3.30)

062(SCO)

-0.2696
(-1.03)

0232(SHE)

0.5115
(0.67)

082(SFL)

-0.1378
(-2 .11)

0242(SNJ)

-0.1126
(-0.37)

092(SGA)

-0.2230
(-1.02)

0262(SOiI)

-0.2471
(-1.31)

0112(SIA)

-0.5221
(-2 .00)

0272(SPA)

-0.1711
(-2.45)

0122(SIL)

-0.6513
(-3.16)

0282CSSC)

-0.3074
(-1.57)

0132(SIH)

-0.3075
(-1.61)

0292(STH)

-0.1519
(-0.63)

01*2(S1CS)

-0.6786
(-2.90)

03O2(STX)

-0.2179
(-1.45)

0152(SKV)

-0.3352
(-1.56)

0312(SVA)

-0.1388
(-2.51)

0162(SLA)

-0.2553
(-1.33)

0322(SWI)

0.7219
(2.22)

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

Chow-STATISTICS

7.18

F
R2
n

7.13
0.15
1290

u
Z*
a

088*1
90'0
88 *«
(*ri-)
1511*0-

(VIS) 910

(zis-)
555**0-

(IMS)Z60

(Cl*E-)
xeiz'o-

(JOS) 5*0

(T5 T-)
5911*0-

(VAS)*60

(ei*G-)
tcez'o-

(SHS)**0

(09*1-)
*A*5*0-

(X1S)060

(es'z-)
8891*0-

(HIS)6*0

(GS't-)
OZTfO-

(HIS)BZ0

azcco-

(IIS)610

(00*1-)
9190*0-

(OSS)660

(EI*6->
ZZ£»•0-

(VIS)**0

(eo*s-)
*90**0-

(vas) « 0

(Z9‘0)
6550*0

(IHS) 0*0

(81**-)
i6oe*o-

(BOS)3Z0

(IZ*»-)
m e *o -

(VOS) 80

(8TZ-)
0191*0-

(AHS)6Z0

((T* *£-)
Z9ZZ*0-

(US) 60

(88*0-)
0190*0-

(fHS)«0

(B8 0 -)
8980*0-

(10S) 10

(TZ*Z-)
SS*Z*0-

(IHS)6Z0

(*9 **-)
Z9T**0-

(OOS) 90

(8B*Z-)
9SZZ*0-

(OHS)660

(ie*t-)
8580*0-

(VDS) 50

HS)*60

(81*0-)
6010*0-

(ZVS) *0

(e b *g -)
Q98Z*0-

(CHS)OZ0

(86*5-)
691**0-

(TVS) 60

(*T"T)
5810*0

(IHS)a*0

(68**1-)
I96T'-

((V)301) 60

(8Z*9~)
608**0-

((MS) 610

(St*Z>
ezso *o

(Aiion) *0

(»S*0-)
91*0*0-

(VHS)6*0

(I0*Zi)
1696*II

aaaaariaa
aia^anaiaj

t^tiaTsTJjaoo
•Tq#T3BA

(BZ'O)
eteo*o

(50*5-)

aa^avnaa
aia^amajaj

IMSZCtf 4- VAS*60 + XI&OC0 + HIS®60 + OSS8Z0
VdS*60 + 809*60 + IMS560 + CNS*60 + ans£60
3HS660 + SHS*60 + CHS060 4-IHS6T0 4- CHS 6*0
VMS 6*0 4. VTS0*0 + JOS5*0 4-SXS**0 + HIS £10
U S 6*0 + VIS**0 + IBS010 + VDS 60 + U S #0
IOS *0 4- M S 90 + VOS 60 + ZVS *0 4- TVS e0

(v)cxn 60 + Aiion 10 4- °0 - « m u
(T«P«H p « v w « * )

I8BI 'lT»r ‘•w*r '*H JO U1UOW «in xoJ
nht^iet) «4«tl-paXTA 30J « n nl*H P*l«ai^as

i*c n n
01

(1HVISHOO) 00

•■4u»T3fjjaoo
*T<taT2BA
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M l * 3.0
Eatimated Reaulta for Fix*d-R«t» Mortgagee
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 1B07
(Erate - 0O + 01 LOGLTV + 02 LOG(A)
03 SAL + 04 SAZ + 03 SCA + 06 SCO + 07 SCT
08 SFL + 09 SGA + 0ioSHI + 0nSIA + 012 SIL
013SIH + 014SKS +
013SKY +
0igSLA +017SMA
018SM) -I- 019SMI +
020SMO +
021 SMS +022SBC
023SHE + 024SHJ +
025SKY +
028SOB +027SPA
020SSC + 02BSTN + 03OSTX + 031STA + 032SWI + 03SR£GKTL

Paramatara
Eatimataa

Variable
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

00 (CONSTANT)

11,8070
(71.73)

017(SMA)

-0.04*353*1
(-0.58)

0,0680
(2.76)

010(SMD)

-0.*7062045

-.202*
(-15.35)

019(SMI)

0.06399119
(0.99)

03 (SAL)

-0.371*
(-*.7*)

020(SM0)

-0.2675*39*
(-3.59)

04 (SAZ)

-0.0076
(-0 .00 )

03 (SCA)

-0.0779
(-1.20)

022(SNC)

-0.2005392*
(2.65)

06 (SCO)

-0.4068
(-*.55)

023(SHE)

-0.22015934
(-1.90)

01 (LOGLTV)
02 (LOG(A))

07 (SCT)

-0.09891336

Variable
Coafflcienta

(-6 .12)

021 (SMS)

0.02995*32
(0.26)

02*(SHJ)

-0.0523*183
(-0.77)

(-1.02)
0a (SFL)

-0.236*9213
(-3.58)

025(SHY)

-0.1*805585
(-1.94)

09 (SGA)

-0.3066*770
(-*.08)

026(SOT)

-0.31810685
(-4.93)

010<SHI)

0.07350933
(0.62)

027(SPA)

-0.41*92326
(-6.07)

011(SIA)

-0.**188891
(-*.81)

02B(SSC)

-0.08*36087
(-0.79)

012(SIL)

-0.38162095
(-5.51)

029(STN)

-0.1*757*95
(-1.76)

013(SIH)

-0.18676971
(-2.51)

030(STX)

-0.496292*2
(-6.89)

014(SKS)

-0.28395859
(-3.72)

031(SVA)

-0.06*14630
(-1.09)

-0.25622563

032(SHI)

-0.45576937
(-5.75)

015(SKY)

(-2 .88)

016(SLA)

b

-0.02963*83
(-0.30)

033(REGKTL)

0.01180636
( 0.73)
29.59
.062
1*899
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Table 3.9
E a t im a t a d R a a u l t a f o r F l x a d - R a t e M o r t g a g e r
f o r ttaa M onth o f M ay, J u n e , J u l y , 1 9 9 7
(T e a tin g f o r p a lr a c o e f f i c i e n t s )
[E r a to -

fl0 +

fix LOGLTV +

fi2 LOG(A)

83 SAL + 94 SAZ + 85 SGA + 9e SCO
98 SFL + 99 SGA + BllBIA + 9l2SIL
913 SIN + B14SKS + 91SSKY + 9lBSLA + 917SMA
91BSMD + 9igSMI -I- 920 SMO + 921 SMS + 9228NC
923SNE + 924SNJ + 926SOH + 927SPA
928SSC + 829STII 4- 930 SIX + 931SVA 4- 932SHI
Bod4- 9ldD*LOGLTV 4- 92dD*L0G(A)
93dD *SA L 4- 9 * d D * S A 2 4- 9 5 d D*SCA 4- 9 6 d D*SCO 4
9 ed D * S F L 4 9 g d D * S 6 A 4 6 10(f)* S H I 4 9 l l J 5 * S I A 4
9 l3 d P * S lH 4
9 n t P * S K S 4 9l3<#>*SKY 4 9 l6 c P * S L A 4
9 i b <#>*SMD 4
9 l9 d P * S M I 4 9 2 0 iP*SM 0 4 9 21<#>*SMS 4
923dP *SN E 4
9 2 4(f>*SN J 4 8 2 JdP*SNY 4 8 26<p*SO H 4
928J>*SSC 4
9 2 8 J)*S T H 4 9 3 0 (P * S T X 4 8 3 1 tP * S V A 4

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatiaiataa

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

8 7 d D*SCT
B l 2e*>*SIL
8 i 7c0*SM A
9 2 2 t P * SNC
9 2 7 c f* S P A
932< #I*SWI

Paramatara
Eatimataa

90 (CONSTANT)

12.06090433
(70.43)

8l7(SMA)

-0.02227056
(-0.28)

(LOGLTV)

0.06560447
(2.60)

9i b (SM)>

-0.23659529
(-2.81)

82 (LOG(A))

"0.21140292
(-15.49)

819(SHI)

0.08216624
(1.20)

83 (SAL)

"0.40140755
(-4.39)

820(SMO)

-0.21671509
(-2.73)

(SAZ)

•0.02006113
(-0.22)

821(SMS)

-0.11416525
( 0.99)

85 (SCA)

-0.05043114
(-0.84)

822(SBC)

-0.04981744
(-0.58)

96 (SCO)

-0.42171076
(-4.46)

823(SHE)

-0.24609382
(-2.17)

8e (SFL)

-0.20656058
(-2.94)

824(SNJ)

-0.04857974
(-0.84)

99 (SGA)

-0.31313526
(-3.93)

926(SOB)

-0.29874504
(-4.34)

Bll(SIA)

-0.46690869
(-4.61)

827(SPA)

-0.39143767
(-5.39)

812(SIL)

-0.30391722
(-4.35)

928(SSC)

-0.03215838
(-0.36)

813(SIN)

-0.16067512
(-2 .01)

829(SIN)

-0.10244508
(-1.16)

914(SKS)

-0.24893574
(-3.09)

830(STX)

-0.71424920
(-9.00)

815(SKY)

-0.26064605
(-2.70)

831(SVA)

0.05335100
( 0.60)

Bie(SLA)

-0.04427469
(-0.34)

832(SHI)

-0.47651663
(-5.74)

fix

fit,
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Tabla 3.8 (eonbinuad)
0od(D*COKSTANT)

-1.36308661
(-2.2B)

0 1 7 d (D*SHA)

1.06639116
(1.31)

01d(D*LOGLTV)

-0.01038033
(-0.19)

018d<D *S® >

-0.93304798
( -4.46)

^2d(D*L0G(A>)

0.13572737
(2.93)

019d(D*SHI)

0.09672799
(0.47)

03d (D*SAL)

-0.08243093
(-0.40)

02Od<D*SMO)

-0.53371693
( -2.40)

04d (D*SAZ)

0.33023628
(1.03)

l21d(D*SMS)

-0.80160473
(-2.31)

05d (D*SCA)

-0.26889048
( -1.24)

022d<D*S»C)

-0.32124213
( -2.38)

06d(D*SCO)

0.13208091
(0.32)

02 3 d (D * S N E )

0.75760713
(0.93)

07d<(l-I»*SCT)

-0.06378314
(-0 .6 6 )

024d(D*SHJ)

-0.06602408
( -0.30)

Pfld (D*SFL)

-0.23122736
(-1.00)

^ 2 5 d C (l-D )* S H Y )

-0.14660646
(-1.84)

0 S d (D*SGA)

0.090121184
(0.37)

026d<D *SO H )

0.05130361
(0.24)

fllOd<d-D)*SHI)

0.07716980
(0.83)

027d(D*SPA)

-0.08299527
( -0.38)

-0.03333195
(-0.19)

d28d(D*SSC)

-0.27328210

fll2d<t>*SIL)

-0.34733439
( -1.85)

829d<I>*STK)

-0.04942335
( -0.18)

0 1 3d (D « S IH )

-0.14679764
( -0.67)

03Od(D*STX>

0.46637803
(2.36)

0»d(D*SKS)

-0.42970722
( -1.63)

631d (D *S V A )

-0.49212164
{ -2.42)

015d(D*SKY)

-0.07437566
( -0.30)

032d (D *S W I)

1.20143BB5
(3.38)

0 1 Bd(D*SLA>

-0.21101849
( -0 .88 )

0 H d(D*SIA)

( -1 .22)

18.02
0.07
14899

7*

Tabla 5.10
Eatimatad Kaaults for Fixad-Rata Mortal***
fox tha Month of Mar, JtMa, July, 1887
i H t l s t fox pairs coaffielanta
]-1 .0 ,1 .0 t
[ E r a t a - 0 O + 0 i LOGLTV + 0 2 LOG(A)
03 SAL + 0* SAZ + 05 SCA + 06 SCO
08 SFL + 09 SGA + 0 1 1 SIA + 0 12S1L
0 1 3 SIN + 0 i i S KS + 0 1 5 SKY + 0 1 0 S L A + 0 1 7 S M A
0 18S M D + 0 1 9 SHI + 0 2 0 SMO + 0 2l S M S + 0 2 2 SHC
0 2 3 SNE + 0 2 1 SNJ 4 026SOH 4 0 2 7 SPA
0 2 8 SSC 4 0 2 8 STN 4 0 3 O STX 4 0 3i S V A 4 0 3 2 SWI

0od+ 01dD*LOGLTV 4 02iiD*LOG(A)
03dD *SA L 4 0 i d D*SAZ 4 0 3(JD*SCA 4
0 8 d D * S F L 4 0 g d D*SSA 4 0 i Otfl* S H I 4
0 1 3 (P * S I R 4
0 U ( p * S K S 4 015rf)*SK Y 4
018dP*SM D 4
0 1 8 J )* S M I 4 02O(P*SMO 4
023<#>*SNE 4
0 2 ir f)« S N J 4 0 2 s J>*SNY 4
02 8 rf)* S S C 4
028rf)*ST N 4 03O<p*STX 4

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paxanatars
Eatimataa

0 6dD*SCO 4 0 7 d D*SCT
0 H (0 ) * S I A 4 0 1 2c#)*S IL
016dP *SL A 4 0 17(jP«SMA
0 2 1<0*SMS 4 0 2 2 (p»SK C
02ScP*SO H 4 0 2 7 <p*SPA
0 3 1<0>*SVA 4 0 3 2 J )* S H I

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

00 (CONSTANT)

11.87629010
(69.48)

017(SMA)

-0.03015272
(-0.38)

01 (LOGLTV)

0.06855977
( 2.71)

018 <SM»

-0.25156190
(-2.99)

(LOG(A))

-0.19572131
(-14.37)

019(SHI)

0.08461996
( 1.25)

03 (SAL)

-0.40320423
(-4.47)

020(SMO)

-0.21752445
(-2.78)

01 (SAZ)

-0.04367471
(-0.48)

021(SMS)

0.11565275
( 1.02)

05 (SCA)

0.07182692
( 1.04)

022(SNC)

-0.05487662
(-0.65)

06 (SCO)

-0.42447662
(-4.56)

023(SHE)

-0.24297084
(-2.18)

0B (SFL)

-0.20634095
(-2.98)

024 (SNJ)

-0.05228878
(-0.73)

09 (SGA)

-0.31617173
(-4.03)

026 (SOB)

-0.29756343
(-4.38)

011(SIA)

-0.46253064
(-4.83)

027(SPA)

-0.39056167
(-5.45)

012(SIL)

-0.30312642
(-4.40)

028(SSC)

-0.04681957
(-0.54)

013(SIN)

-0.14491984
(-1.83)

029(STN)

-0.10160044
(-1.16)

011(SKS)

-0.24939546
(-3.14)

030(STX)

-0.71372409
(-9.11)

015(SET)

-0.25960426
(-2.73)

031(SVA)

0.04888879
( 0.56)

016(SLA)

-0.01995749
(-0.16)

032(5WI)

-0.47349504
(-5.79)

02
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Tabla 3.10 (continuad)
fiOi(D*COHSTANT)

0.13*84568

016d(D*SLA)

( 0 .11)
/*ld (D*LOGLTV)

-0.30685505
(-2.40)

018d(D*SHD)

-0.66500010
( -1.14)
-1.88038415
( -3.28)

0.20213728
(2.54)

4igd(D*SMI)

-0.58300572
(-1 .02)

03d(D»SAL)

-0.58366548
( -1.03)

P 2 0 d (0 * S M 0 )

-1.14078628
( -1.84)

0 4 d (D * S A Z )

-0.08073111
( -0.13)

P2 ld(D *SM S)

-1.28015408
(-1.63)

05d (D*SCA)

-0.83241452
( -1.44)

P22d(0*SHC)

-1.08858358
( -1.72)

06d(D*SCO)

0.48713068
(0.51)

P24d(D*SHJ)

-0.68671407
( -1.20)

tf7d«l-D)*SCT)

-0.07100861
(-0.73)

P25d((l-D)*SMY)

-0.15334507
(-1.85)

Pad(D*s g a >

-0.48839002
(-0.78)

P26d(0*SOH)

-0.32007368
( -0.54)

0.07030775
(0.77)

^27d<0*SPA)

-0.85823870
( -1.46)

Pl2d<D*SIt.)

-0.03434075
( -1.63)

P29d(D*STN)

0.10084172
( 0.13)

P l3 d (D * S I N )

-0.73711016
( -1.28)

P30d(D*STX)

-0.03520774
{ -0.06)

Pl*d(D*SKS)

-1.27065002
( -2 .00)

P32d(D*SWI)

0.60687887
(0.05)

PlOd(tl-D)*SHI)

20.58
0.08
13680
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Tabla 3.11
E a t im a t a d R a a u l t a f o r F i x a d - R a t a H o r t g a c a a
f o r t h a M onth o f H a y , J u n a , J u l y , 1 9 6 7
T a a tln g f o r p a ir s c o a f f i e l a n t a
T ia t a la r /Z a n j a n d O o ld f a ld /Q u a n d t
) - l . 3 ,1 .3[
t E r a t a - 0 O + 01 LOGLTV + 0 2 LOG (A )
3 3 SAL + 0 * SAZ + 0 5 SCA + 0 6 SCO
3 a SFL + 0 a SGA + 011S I A + 012 S IL
0 1 3 S IN + 0 1 4 SK3 + 0 1 5 SKY + 0 i« S L A + 0 1 7 SMA
0 1SS H D + 0 iq S H I + 0 2 0 SMO + 0 2 1 SMS + 0 2 2 SNC
0 2 3 SHE + 0 2 * SN J + 0 2 8 SOB + 0 2 7 SPA
0 2 6 SSC + 0 2 9 STN + 03QSTX + 0 31S V A + 0 3 2 SWI

0od+ 01dD*LOGLTV + 02dD*LOG(A)
03dD *SA L + 0*dD *SA Z + 03dD *SC A + 0edD *SC O + 07dD *SC T
0 8 d D * S F L + 0gdI>*SGA + 0 io < P * S H I + 011<P* 5IA + 0 n J » S IL
0 1 3 < p * S IN +
0 i* < p * S K S + 015(P»S1CY 4 016<P<<SLA 4 0i7<P*SM A
018<P*SMD 4
0 i9 c p * S M I 4 02O<P<<SHO 4 0 2 i<p*SM S 4 0 22j)* S N C
023<P*SN E 4
0 2 * < p * S N J 4 0 25<p*SNY 4 0 26<P*SOB 4 0 2 7<p*SPA
02B cP *SSC 4
029<p*ST N 4 03O<P<<STX 4 03 l< p * S V A 4 0 32<P*SHI
Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

Varlabla
Coaffielanta

Paramatara
Eatimataa

11.87149463
(69.28)

017 (SMA)

-0.03075893
(-0.39)

01 (LOGLTV)

0.06731297
(2.63)

018 (SW)

-0.23191716
(-2.99)

02 (L0G(A))

-0.19479837
(-14.27)

019(SMI)

0.06462164
( 1.25)

03 (SAL)

-0.40330993
(-4.47)

020(SMO)

-0.21540704
(-2.75)

04 (SAZ)

-0.04383167
(-0.46)

021(SMS)

0.12154292
( 1.06)

05 (SCA)

0.07123580
( 1.03)

022(SNC)

-0.05494940
(-0.63)

08 (SCO)

-0.42489915
(-4.56)

023(SHE)

-0.24274464
(-2.17)

08 (SFL)

-0.20638882
(-2.98)

024(SNJ)

-0.03294033
(-0.74)

0a (SGA)

-0.31637086
(-4.03)

026(SOB)

-0.2B751929
(-4.36)

011(SIA)

-0.46225414
(-4.83)

027(SPA)

-0.39056590
(-5.45)

012(SIL)

-0.30327650
(-4.40)

028(SSC)

-0.07073914
(-0.80)

013(SIN)

-0.14362439
(-1.81)

029(STN)

-0.082780B7
(-0.94)

014(SKS)

-0.25350110
(-3.12)

030(STX)

-0.71366448
(-9.11)

013<SKT)

-0.25936216
(-2.73)

031(SVA)

0.04859720
( 0.35)

016 (SLA)

-0.0211172
(-0.16)

032 (SHI)

-0.47335051
(-3.76)

00 (CONSTANT)
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Tabl* 5.11 (contlnuad)
0,138741*3

Bl M (»*SLA>

-0.66484567
( -1.14)

(D*LOGLTV)

-0.38560915
(-2.48)

8 l8 d (D * S W l)

-1.88002688
( -3.27)

ft!d (0*LOG(A))

0.20121433
(2.52)

01Bd(D*SHI)

-0.58309760

-0.58355876

^20d(D*SHO>

-1.14290369
( -1.94)

0Od(D*COHSTAHT)
B id

03d<D*SAL)

(0 .12)

( -1.02)

( -1.02)

04dCD*SAZ)

-0.08057395
( -0.13)

^21d(D*SMS)

-1.29604425
(-1.64)

05dC D *SC A )

-0.83182340
( -1.44)

^22d(D*SHC)

-1.08951081
( -1.72)

06d(D*SCO)

0.48735321
(0.51)

624d<0«SKJ)

-0.68805352
( -1.20)

025d<<l-D>*SHY)

-0.15373757
(-1.96)

-0.48819090
( -0.79)

^28d(D*S0B)

-0.32101782
{ -0.54)

0.06896374
(0.76)

827d(D*SPA)

-0.85921546
( -1.46)

-0.93419068
( -1.63)

629d(D*SIH)

0.06202216

B l3 d (D * S I H )

-0.73841461
( -1.28)

630d(0*STX)

-0.03535735
( -0.06)

B l 4d<D*SKS)

-1.26654530
( -2.06)

B32d<D*SWI)

0.60673434
(0.95)

£7d<U-I»*SCT>
f i g i (D*SGA)

B lO d t ( 1 “D )* S H I )

0 1 2 d (D * S X L )

-0.07142218
(-0.73)

(0 .10)

20.51
0.08
13635
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Table 5.12

Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Unrestricted Model)
[Erate, = J8 , +

Variable
Coefficients
0O1 (CONSTANT)

LOGLTV + 02, LOG (A)]
(i-1,2)

Parameter
Estimates
11.7448
(76.96)

(LOGLTV)

-0.0184
(-0.73)

021 (LOG (A))

-.1662
(-13.45)

p02 (CONSTANT)

10.5911
(17.86)

Pn (LOGLTV)

-0.0209
(-0.22)

J922 (LOG(A))

-0.0741
(-1.62)

Chow-STATISTICS

13.26

51
F?
R*

98.77
1.46
.02
.01
13609
1289

R2
n1
n2
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Table 5.13

Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Restricted Model)
[Erate *= 0O + /3, LOGLTV + 02 LOG(A)]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

0Q (CONSTANT)

11.7153

(79.31)

Pi (LOGLTV)

-0.0276

(-1.14)

02 (LOG(A))

-0.1611

(-13.49)
101.06
0.02
14899

F
R2
n

Table 5.14
Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June , July, 1987
[Erate = 0O + 0y LOGLTV + 02 LOG (A) + 0Z REGKTL]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

0O (CONSTANT)

11.5743

(78.29)

0, (LOGLTV)

-0.0089

(-0.37)

02 (LOG(A))

-0.1619

(-13.61)

0Z (REGKTL)

.0121

(10.21)

F
R2
n

102.58
0.02
14899
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Table 5.15

ML Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Unrestricted Model)
Using Goldfeld and Quandt
[Erate, - 0oi + pu LOGLTV + £z, LOG (A) ]
(i=l,2)

Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

0O1 (CONSTANT)

11.0004
(198.31)

(LOGLTV)

0.0026
(1.13)

(LOG(A))

-0.0994
(-46.18)

fi02 (CONSTANT)

14.1014
(134.19)

PK (LOGLTV)

-0.0594
(-3.39)

P$2 (“ 6(A))

-0.3947
(-68.13)

-2 *LR-STATISTICS
Switched Point
Variance

139.66
-1.00
0.8105

Table 5.16

HL Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Unrestricted Model)
Using Tishler and Zang
[Erate, = *•! + fi,. LOGLTV + fi2i LOG (A) ]
(1=1,2)
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

/801 (CONSTANT)

11.6000

(216.16)

(LOGLTV)

-0.0199

(-9.43)

041 (LOG (A))

-0.1500

(-71.04)

0O2 (CONSTANT)

11.8809

(114.91)

/812 (LOGLTV)

-0.0074

(-0.43)

042 (LOG (A))

-0.1998

(-37.24)

-2 *LR-STATISTICS
Switched Point
Variance

77.24
-0.395
0.8123
Table 5.17

ML Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Restricted Model)
Using Goldfeld and Quandt and Tishler and Zang
[Erate - Po + J0, LOGLTV + 02 LOG (A) ]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

0O (CONSTANT)

11.2193

(148.92)

0, (LOGLTV)

0.0585

(8.18)

fit (LOG(A))

-0.1493

(-56.00)

t-Statistic

chapter vz
Modal Specifications and Empirical Rasulta
Tba Casa of Adjustable-Rate Mortgagas

This chapter applies the three estimation techniques
described in chapter IV to the pricing of Adjustable-Rate
Mortgages (ARMs). The chapter starts out with the pricing
estimation of ARMs.

Finally, empirical results and

discussions are presented.

6.1

The Pricing of Adjustable Rata Mortgagas.

Adjustable-rate mortgages are the most popular
alternative to the traditional fixed rate loans.

ARMs carry

an interest rate which can adjust during the life of the
loan, and is usually tied to some financial index, such as
the rate on the 6-month treasury-bills or 1-year treasury
notes; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average
contract rate; and the average cost of funds for federallyinsured savings and loan associations.
ARMs have grown in popularity as a solution to the
thrift industry's liquidity crisis of the early 1980's.
Furthermore, as fixed-rate mortgage rates become very high,
the house affordability index falls to a low level.
then,

ARMs,

provide a means for potential borrowers to obtain

homeownership. In addition, ARMs also serve as a hedging
mechanism for the lender's portfolio.
usually includes key features such as
82

A basic ARM contract

(1)

interest rate caps which limit the change in the
contract rate on the adjustment period.

If market

rates rise above the cap, the lender suffers a loss in
interest.

Interest rate caps are typically 1 or 2

percent points above or below the last period's rate.
(2)

an adjustable interest rate ties to certain market
interest rate index.

(3)

a margin of contract rate above the market index.

This

margin is usually fixed ranging from 100 to 300 basis
points.

However, the margin in the subsequent years

generally is higher than in the first year;
(4)

Some ARMs may also include lifetime interest rate caps.
Lifetime caps usually set at around 5 percentage points
above the initial contract rate.

(5)

Payment caps are sometimes specified in place of
interest rate caps.
periodic payments.

They limit the increase in
Unlike interest rate caps, the

lender's loss in interest from sudden increase in rates
is usually carried forward through negative
amortization.

A typical payment cap is 7.5 percent per

year, with 125 percent limit on negative amortization.
The market value of an ARM depends upon the contractual
variation, the characteristics of the index rate, prepayment
behavior, current and future interest rates and the
probability of default.
the value of an ARM.

Each of these variations can affect
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Higher margins result in larger payments, but also are
conducive to a higher probability of prepayment.

The

greater the frequency of adjustment, the greater will be the
value of an ARM, in rising interest rate expectation.

The

longer the period between adjustments, the more an ARM will
resemble a fixed rate mortgage, and the lesser will be the
price of an ARM as the mortgage is more exposed to interest
rate risk.

And finally, periodic and lifetime caps restrict

upward movement of the contract rate and, thus, decrease the
value of the ARM.
The teaser rate or the initial period discount, will
reduce the value of an ARM.

Assumability has a negative

effect upon mortgage value, but the effect is not nearly as
great as it is for fixed rate loans. The choice of index may
be important in the determination of the market value of an
ARM.

One year treasury rate is the most typical due to its

correlation with the relevant market rate.
Prepayment detracts from the value of an ARM.

Assuming

no transaction costs, prepayment occurs when the market
interest rate is less than the contract rate.

Since the

contract rate also decreases with the market rate for an
ARM, it is expected that the probability of prepayment will
be less than that associated with a fixed rate mortgage.
However, there exists sub-optional prepayment regardless of
the relationship between the original contract rate and the
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market rate due to borrower's perceived minimal rate,
prepayment may still be substantial.
In addition to these variables, the institutional
aspects of the thrift will also affect the value of
mortgages as previously discussed in the FRM case.

That is,

in pricing their loans, insolvent institutions will
systematically underprice the mortgage.
The following regression model is estimated for
adjustable rate mortgage:

ERATE = b0 + b,LTV + b2LOG (A) + b3CAP + b*LIFE
+ b5ADJ + b6TEASER + b^REGKTL

(8)

where
ERATE = the effective interest rate
LTV = the loan-to-value ratio
A - the amount of loan
CAP « the periodic rate cap
LIFE = the lifetime rate cap
ADJ = the adjustment period
TEASER = the initial discount amount
REGKTL = the capital-to-asset ratio

As discussed in the pricing of FRMs section, the
effective yield and loan-to-value ratio are positively
correlated, so are the institution's capital ratio, the
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frequency of adjustment and the teaser.

The remaining

coefficients should be negative.
Similarly, the switching models for the pricing of
adjustable-rate mortgages are specified as:

ERATE, * a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a31 CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + 0t61 TEASER, + 6,
(if REGKTL ) 0)

(9)

ERATE, = a02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42LIFE, + a52 ADJ, +
+ e2

TEASER,

(if REGKTL <« 0)

(10)

6.2 The Chow Test For Adjustable-Rate Mortgage

The Chow test aims to test equality of sets of
coefficients in two regressions is now widely used in
econometric and other research.

The basic regression model

of (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
Y1 = xi^i + ei
and
Yj = x202 + e2
where £, and are least squares estimator vectors and e, are
residual vectors.
model is:
Y - x£ + e

An alternative expression of the above
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The null hypothesis is
H0: 0, * 02
where ^ = On» *••*

1

&z * ^ 2 ^t •*** &2k^ '1 ^^e ^,—

test statistic, known as the Chow test is given by
(Qr Q2)/k
F(k, n,+n2-2k) = ---------------Q2/(n,+n2-2k)
where
n, = sample size in regime i (i=l,2)
Q, = Y'[I - X(X'X)'^X' ]Y, the constrained sum of squared
residuals
Q2 - V C I - X ^ V X ^ X ^ + Y ^ I - X ^ X ^ r ’x^Ya
Y, = n, x 1 vector of observations in the dependent
variable regime i (i=l#2)
X, = n, x k matrix of observations on the explanatory
variables in regime i (i=l,2)
6.3

The Estimation of ARMs using Goldfeld and Quandt Model

The rate equations with 'solvent' and 'insolvent*
regimes can then be rewritten as:

ERATE, = [1 - D,]{ct01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a3, CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a51 ADJ, + a6, TEASER,}
+ {o02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42 LIFE, + a52 ADJ,
+ e, (1 - D,) + D, e2

TEASER,} D,
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The log-likelihood function (L) of the above
specification equation is:

L - (n/2) LOG (2JT) - h E LOG [0]
- h Z {ERATE, - [X - D,][a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,)
+ a3, CAP, + a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a6, TEASER, ]
- [o02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,+ a42LIFE,
+ a52 ADJ, + aa TEASER, ]D,>n‘1

where

(1 is the covariance matrix of e.

Again, the D, function follows the specification of
Goldfeld and Quandt:

D,(regKTL) =

where

(1/(/(2»r)a)) exp[-€2/(2a2)]d?

5 is N(o, a2)

The maximum likelihood estimation procedure will
determine the values for a01, cr,,, a21, a31, a41, a51, a61, a02,
®12'

6.4

a 22'

a 32'

a 42'

a 52 a n d

a 62*

Estimations For ARMs using Tishler and zang Model

The model for the pricing of adjustable-rate mortgages
are specified as:
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ERATE, « a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a31 CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a61 TEASER, + 6,
(if REGKTL ) 0)

ERATE, = a02 + a12 LTV, +

LOG (A,) +

+ a42LIFE, + a52 ADJ, +
+ e2

CAP,

TEASER,

(if REGKTL < 0)

The rate equations can then be rewritten as:

ERATE,

= [1 - D,]{a01 + O,, LTV, + C21 LOG (A,) + a3, CAP,
+ a4, LIFE, + a51 ADJ, + a61 TEASER,}
+ {aQ2 + o,2 LTV, + 022 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42 LIFE, + a52 ADJ,

TEASER,} D,

+ C, (1 “ D,) + D, €2

with the log-1ikelihood function

L = (n/2) LOG (2*) - h E LOG [ft]
- h s (ERATE, - [1 - D,][a01 + O,,

LTV, +

a2,LOG(A,)

+ a3, CAP, + a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a6,TEASER,]
“ [^02 + tt12 LTV» + a22

(Af) + a32 CAPf+

+ a52 ADJ, + aa TEASER, ]D,}ft’1

where

ft is the covariance matrix of c.

Again, the D, function is specified as follows

LIFE,
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0

if r, < -c
1

3

l

D(rt) = {--- +
2
1

r, 4c

r? if -c < r, < c
4ce
if r, > c

The maximization of L gives the maximum likelihood
estimation for parameter j0o1, pQZ,

012, 021 and 0Z2 for

ARHs.

6.5

Data Descriptions
Data in this study are obtained from the Federal Home

Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). These information on mortgages are
collected monthly by the FHLBB from all major lenders
including savings and loan associations, commercial banks
and mortgage bankers.

The loans are both fixed-rate and

adjustable-rate mortgages on single-family residential
properties and are permanent fully amortizing, first
mortgages on properties.

There are, however, some

construction-purchase loans also included in the data set.
These mortgages are conventional loans closed during the
first five working days of the month.
The FHLB data include information on various
characteristics of individual mortgages including fees
charged up front, contract interest rate, the term to
maturity, the mortgage loan amount, the loan-to-value ratio
and the type of originator.

The effective interest rate is

also reported in the survey based on loans amortized over
ten years.

Since 1986, the base rate for all loans and the
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Interest rate adjustment-period and life-of-loan interest
rate caps for adjustable-rate mortgages are also included in
the survey data.

The type of index is, however, not

included in the FHLBB survey data.

In addition to the FHLB

data, the quarterly financial data on all lenders are also
collected.

These institutional specific data include

financial characterics of individual lenders.
Descriptive statistics of all adjustable-rate mortgages
are reported in Table 6.1 to 6.5.

A total of 13,662

adjustable rate loans were originated during the three peak
loan closing months of 1987.

A majority of these mortgages

were originated by healthy thrift institutions.

The number

of adjustable rate loans issued by insolvent thrift
institutions was less than two percent of all AKMs.

On the

average, an ARM originated by a solvent institution has
higher loan-to-value ratio, and higher periodic and life-ofloan interest rate caps than an ARM originated by an
insolvent institution.

However, the adjustment period of an

insolvent thrift's adjustable rate loan is higher.

Similar

to fixed-rate mortgages, the largest number of adjustable
rate loans were originated by lenders in California.

Tables

6.14 and 6.15 give the distribution of ARMs for various
ranges of ARMs for various ranges of life-of-loan and
periodic-rate caps by states.

Differences in means of

effective interest rates for ARMs with periodic rate cap
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[0,2%] are also tested and are reported In Table 6.6 for
solvent and Insolvent institutions for various states.
To conduct the empirical analysis, a subset of
adjustable-rate mortgages was chosen which only include
loans with periodic rate cap [0,2%] originated in
California.

A single state was used to minimize the effect

of regional variations in default losses.

Tests for

differences in means are also performed on the data.

Table

6.7 reports the results of differences in means tests for
all adjustable rate loans with periodic rate caps [0,2%]
originated by both sets of institutions.

The results

indicate that, indeed, insolvent thrifts do significantly
underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages as compared to
loans offered by healthy institutions.

The t-test for

testing the hypothesis of no differences in the true means
between solvent and insolvent institutions are further
extended to various ranges of teaser rates.
these tests are included in Table 6.8.

The results of

The same conclusion

can also be drawn from the results of these differences of
the mean tests.

In general, insolvent thrift institutions

seem to underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages vis-a-vis
solvent institutions.

The differences in the pricing are

further tested using the Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt and
Tishler and Zang techniques.

6.6

Empirical results and discussion
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It is argued throughout this dissertation that
insolvent saving and loans institutions will systematically
underprice their loan products by offering mortgages at a
discount.

This section attempts to test this underpricing

hypothesis for the case of adjustable-rate mortgages using
the Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt, and Tishler and Zang tests
specified in Chapter IV.
In all tests the results indicate that insolvent saving
and loans institutions do significantly underprice their
adjustable-rate mortgages.

The Chow test results in a Chow-

statistic of 29.84 which is highly significant.

The same

results are also achieved for the Goldfeld and Quandt and
the Tishler and Zang tests.

The values of -2*Loglikelihood

ratios are 108.54 and 92.78 for the Goldfeld and Quandt and
the Tishler and Zang methods respectively, which are also
statistically significant at one percent level.

The optimal

switched points are found to be at -1.00 and -1.56
respectively for the two techniques.

With variances of

0.160 and 0.161, the 95% confidence intervals for the two
tests are [-1.76, 0.24] and [-2.35, 0.77], respectively.
Table 6.13

presents the results for the Goldfeld and Quandt

test and Table 6.14 is the result of the Tishler and Zang
test.

In order to calculate the %2 test statistics, the

constrained maximum likelihood estimation is also run using
the restricted model, and the results are reported in Table
6.15.
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Table 6.9 presents the results of the unconstrained
models for adjustable-rate mortgages.

The subscript i« 1,2

represents the solvent and insolvent institutions,
respectively.

All coefficients for the solvent institutions

are significant while only the coefficient of the constant
is significant for the insolvent case.

The insignificance

of these variables is to a large extent consistent with the
underpricing proposition.

Furthermore, the test for pair

coefficients are also performed in order to see which of the
variables are priced differently between the two sets of
institutions.13 From Table 6.12, the periodic rate cap and
the adjustment period variables are significantly different
between institutions.

The positive coefficient of the

difference in coefficients and the insignificant cap
variable of the insolvent institutions indicates the
insensitivity of these institutions to changing in periodic
rate cap.

That is, solvent institutions charge higher rates

for tighter periodic rate caps than insolvent institutions.
For every percent decrease in a periodic-rate cap, a solvent
saving and loans association would charge 39.7 basis points
higher than would a insolvent institution.

A large change

in the level of rate is of inconsequential to the insolvent
institutions, since it already is insolvent.

It is a no

loss proposition for the insolvent savings and loan to take

13Same results are also obtained with weighted least
square regression
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on a higher level of risks.

The results are consistent with

the theory.
The sane argument can also apply for the negative and
significance of the difference in the adjustment variable
(i.e., 0W= 0insolvent-/9iolvem) since the longer the adjustment
period, the lesser the frequency of adjustment.

Therefore,

a higher the rate is charged on an adjustable-rate mortgage
which, in turn, implies that a insolvent savings and loan
institution will charge less for a longer period between
adjustment.

Table 6.10 gives the estimated results for the

restricted model where all coefficients are constrained to
be equal across all solvent and insolvent institutions.
To further show that insolvent institutions underbid
their adjustable-rate mortgage, a capital-to-asset variable
is included in the model as proxy for the financial status
of an institution.

The healthier a savings and loans

association, the higher the ratio, since the estimated value
of this variable is statistically significant and is
positive.

It is further showed that, indeed, the healthier

an savings and loan institution the higher the rate it will
charge on its adjustable rate loans, or that insolvent
institutions underprice their adjustable-rate mortgage loans
vis-a-vis solvent institutions as dictated in the theory
chapter.

6.7

Conclusions
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This chapter presents the model specifications for the
case of adjustable-rate mortgages.

The Chow, Goldfeld and

Quandt and Tishler and Zang techniques previously discussed
are used to test for the pricing differentials across
solvent and insolvent savings and loans institutions.
Overall, the results are consistent with the proposed
theory.

That is, in general, failed or failing institutions

do indeed underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages.
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Table 6.1

Effective Rates on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
Originated Between May and July 1987
Number
of
Loans

Date

Mean

Variance

Range

Solvent Institutions
May 1987

2986

8.207

.596

5.93-11.27

June 1987

4931

8.310

.597

6.13-11.35

July 1987

5511

8.451

.637

5.96-12.41

13428

8.345

.616

5.93-12.41

7.897

.421

7.03-10.59

May-July 1987

Insolvent Institutions
May 1987

57

June 1987

93

8.255

.450

7.20-10.86

July 1987

84

8.275

.569

7.27-11.20

234

8.175

.447

7.03-11.20

May 1987

3043

8.201

.582

5.93-11.27

June 1987

5024

8.309

.595

6.13-11.35

July 1987

5595

8.448

.636

5.96-12.41

May-July 1987

13662

8.342

.614

5.93-12.41

May-July 1987
All Institutions
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Table 6.2

Characteristics of ARMs Originated for
the Months of May Through July 1987

a)

Insolvent

Solvent

Both

76.58

77.43

77.42

10-100

10-100

2.14

15.44

15.21

.5-99.99

01-99.99

01-99.99

5.75

6.12

6.11

LTV (%)
average
range

b)

25.52-95

Periodic cap
average
range

c)

Life of Loan cap
average

1-99.99

1-99.99

1-99.99

average

12.10

10.75

10.77

range

6-60

1-60

1-60

N

234

range
d)

Adjustment Period

13428

13662
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Table 6.3

Distribution of ARMs by Various States and
Period of Adjustments
(1987)

State

1 month

6 months

12months

CA

3130

1718

1620

FL

384

23

1027

IL

160

40

289

HA

43

12

212

HO

84

4

201

NJ

16

3

351

NY

148

7

835

OH

79

11

225

TN

22

8

156

TX

56

1

74

WA

47

8

167
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Table 6.4

Number of ARMs for Various Ranges of Life-of-Loan Cap
For the Year 1987

State

[0,2[

[2,4[

[4,6[

>=6

CA

2

82

5871

540

FL

-

—

882

705

IL

2

22

436

135

MA

-

—

115

240

MO

-

3

200

175

NJ

-

10

301

407

NY

-

270

462

511

OH

-

11

343

150

TN

-

TX

-

HA

_

3
1
7

137
110
208

54
34
60

101

Table 6.5

Number of ARMs for Various Ranges of Periodic Cap Rate
For the Year 1987

State

[0,2[

[2,4[

[4,6[

>=6

CA

1751

1354

1753

637

FL

63

1140

314

67

IL

70

MA

15

MO

9

NJ

6

659

16

37

NY

57

948

152

86

OH

146

259

84

15

347
286
285

177
43
83

1
11
1

TN

80

TX

9

80

46

10

WA

12

144

47

72

82

28

4
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Table 6.6

Differences in effective rates between
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap [0f2%]
originated by solvent and Insolvent Thrift Institutions
in various states for May-July 1987

State

AL
AR
CA
FL
GA
IL
IN
KY
LA
MI
MO
NJ
OH
OK
TX
WA

Solvent Thrift
(number of loans)

8.463
(29)
8.282
(18)
8.015
(2465)
7.868
(816)
8.184
(177)
8.448
(256)
8.619
(92)
8.438
(69)
8.277
(7)
8.570
(113)
8.249
(235)
8.533
(539)
8.827
(240)
8.285
(12)
8.486
(34)
8.598
(67)

Insolvent Thrift
(number of loans)

8.467
(11)
8.268
(12)
7.861
(102)
8.110
(2)
8.785
(4)
8.483
(12)
9.557
(3)
7.990
(3)
7.870
(1)
8.514
(7)
7.735
(6)
7.961
(10)
8.333
(12)
8.363
(3)
8.498
(12)
8.025
(2)

* indicates significance at the 0.05 level

Difference in
means test
(T-statistics)

-0.004
(-0.02)
0.014
(0.06)
0.154
(3.28)*
-0.242
(-0.50)
-0.601
(-1.15)
-0.035
(-0.15)
-0.938
(-2.27)*
0.448
(2.22)*
0.357
(0.43)
0.056
(0.28)
0.514
(1.55)
0.572
(3.09)*
0.494
(2.31)*
-0.078
(-0.27)
-0.012
(-0.05)
0.573
(0.91)
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Table 6.7
Differences in effective rates between
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap [0,2%]
originated by solvent and insolvent thrift institution
in state of Califorinia for May-June 1987

Solvent Thrifts

Insolvent Thrifts

mean

8.015

7.861

variance

0.219

0.089

6.39-10.95

7.38-9.30

2465

102

range
N
Difference in means test
(t-statistic)

* indicates significance at the 0.05 level

0.154
(3.28)*
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Table 6.8

Differences in effective rates between
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap
[0,2%] originated by solvent and insolvent institutions in
state of California for May-July 1987
Teaser
[0,1[

[1.2[

[2,4[

8.131
(719)
.308
6.39-10.95

8.026
(1231)
0.150
7.03-10.0

7.823
(515)
0.205
6.70-9.99

7.856
33
0.095
7.57-9.30

7.936
42
0.086
7.40-8.59

7.752
27
0.073
7.38-8.38

Difference in mean
test
0.275
(t-statistic)
(4.79)

0.090
(1.94)

0.071
(1.28)

Solvent
mean
N
variance
range
Insolvent
mean
N
variance
range

Table 6.9

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, - 0O. + /}„ LTV + 0^. LOG (A) + 03, TEASER
+ 0.. CAP + 0Si LIFE + p6i ADJ]

(1-1 ,2 )
Variable
Coefficients *

Parameter
Estimates

0O1 (Constant)

10.1270

(42.94)

0.0099

(13.73)

021 (Log (Amount) )

-0.1654

(-8.61)

j9}1 (Teaser Rate)

-0.0498

(-5.25)

-0.4988

(-15.22)

051 (Life of Loan Cap)

-0.1718

(-10.34)

061 (Adjustment Period)

0.0809

(15.72)

PQZ (CONSTANT)

8.9963

(10.07)

0K (Loan to value ratio)

0.0041

(1.42)

0 22 (LOG (Amount))

-0.0911

(-1.26)

0 32 (Teaser Rate)

-0.0820

(-1.51)

0 iZ (Periodic Rate Cap)

-0.1016

(-0.86)

0 S2 (Life of Loan Cap)

-0.0213

(-0.37)

-0.0021

(-0.22)

(Loan to Value Ratio)

(Periodic Rate Cap)

0a

(Adjustment Period)

ChOW—STATISTICS
Fa
R*
R2
n1
n2
* See text for definition of variables

t-Statistic

29.84
138.03
1.03
0.25
0.06
2464
102
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Table 6.10

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Constrained Model)
[Erate • p + p. LTV + P2 LOG (A) + JB, TEASER + p. CAP
+ P- LIFE + Pl ADJ]

Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

p0 (Constant)

10.1140
(43.52)

py (Loan to Value Ratio)

0.0098
(13.71)

P2 (Log(Amount))

-0.1641
(-8.67)

pz (Teaser Rate)

-0.0494
(-5.29)

(Periodic Rate Cap)
P5 (Life of Loan Cap)
p6 (Adjustment Period)

-0.4021
(-13.01)
-0.1642
(-1 0 .12 )
0.0608
(13.10)
123.83
0.23

n

2567

Table 6.11

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
[Erate - 0 + 0 . LTV + 0, LOG (A) + 0, TEASER + 0, CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ + 07 REGKTL]

Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

0O (CONSTANT)

10.0613
(43.33)

0! (LTV)

0.0098
(13.74)

02 (LOG(A))

-0.1646
(-8.72)

03 (TEASER)

-0.0410
(-4.28)

0« (CAP)

-0.4204
(-13.47)

05 (LIFE)

-0.1643
(-10.15)

06 (ADJ)

0.0650
(13.66)

07 (REGKTL)
F
R2
n

0.0065
(3.80)
108.76
0.23
2567

Table 6.12

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
[Erate - 0O + 0. LTV + 0, LOG (A) + p, TEASER +
CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ]
D + 0id D*LTV + 0M D*LOG(A) + 0M D*TEASER
+ fi” D*CAP +
D*LIFE i
B*ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

/30 (CONSTANT)

10.1270

(43.31)

0.0099

(13.84)

/92 (LOG(A))

-0.1654

(-8.69)

/93 (TEASER)

-0.0498

(-5.30)

04 CCAP)
05 (LIFE)

-0.4988

(-15.35)

-0.1718

(-10.43)

0.0809

(15.86)

0Od (°)

-1.1307

(-0.92)

01d (D*LTV)

-0.0058

(-1.45)

01 (LTV)

06

(ADJ)

0 2d

(D*LOG(A))

0.0743

(0.75)

03d

(D*TEASER)

-0.0321

(-0.44)

0.3972

(2.45)

0M (D*CAP)
0 5d

(D*LIFE)

0.1506

(1.89)

06d

(D*ADJ)

-0.0830

(-6.00)

F
R2
n

66.17
0.25
2567
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Table 6.13

ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
Using Goldfeld and Quandt
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, = fiQ{ + fiu LTV + fi2i LOG (A) + fiZi TEASER + fi.. CAP
+ fi5i LIFE + fi6i ADJ]
(i-1,2)
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

/801 (CONSTANT)

10.0145

(140.92)

0.0099

(10.12)

(LOG (A))

-0.1530

(-14.54)

fin (TEASER)

-0.0203

(-1.74)

041 (CAP)

-0.4498

(-12.16)

fin (LIFE)

-0.2199

(-12.55)

P61 (ADJ)

0.0896

(15.54)

10.1437

(28.42)

0.0080

(1.61)

fi2Z (LOG(A))

-0.1516

(-2.63)

fiZ2 (TEASER)

-0.3587

(-6.38)

0*2 (CAP)

-0.6416

(-3.40)

fi52 (LIFE)

0.0763

(1.10)

0a (ADJ)

-0.0049

(-0.19)

fi„ (LTV)

fim (CONSTANT)
fin (LTV)

-2 *LR-STATISTICS
Switched point
Variance

108.5406
-1.00
0.1600
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Table 6.14

ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
Using Tishler and Zang
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, - 0 . + 0U LTV + 0~. LOG (A) + 03, TEASER + 04, CAP
■*" 05, LIFE +
ADJ]
(i-1,2)
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

/301 (CONSTANT)

10.1046

(183.43)

0.0098

(14.12)

021 (LOG (A))

-0.1633

(-23.01)

031 (TEASER)

-0.0499

(-5.66)

04, (CAP)

-0.4993

(-17.01)

051 (LIFE)

-0.1713

(-14.12)

061 (ADJ)

0.0810

(16.53)

0O2 (CONSTANT)

8.9647

(26.90)

012 (LTV)

0.0041

(0.65)

022 (LOG (A))

-0.0888

(-1.34)

032 (TEASER)

-0.0816

(-0.96)

042 (CAP)

-0.1019

(-0.42)

052 (LIFE)

-0.0208

(-0.18)

062 (ADJ)

-0.0019

(-0.06)

(LTV)

-2*LR-STATISTICS
Switched point
Variance

92.77739
-1.56
0.1606

Table 6.15

ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
Using Goldfeld and Quandt/Tishler and Zang
(Constrained Model)
[Erate - 0O + 0, LTV + 02 LOG (A) + 0, TEASER + 0, CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients
*0 (CONSTANT)
*

h

(LTV)

Parameter
Estimates
10.1130
(189.72)
0.0098
(14.50)

(LOG(A))

-0.1640
(-24.07)

(TEASER)

-0.0494
(-5.75)

(CAP)
05 (LIFE)
06 (AIXJ)

-0.4022
(-16.27)
-0.1642
(-14.94)
0.0608
(17.61)
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Table 6.16

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
]-3,3[
[Erate - 0. + 0. LTV + 02 LOG (A) + 03 TEASER + 0, CAP
+ 0. LIFE + 0t ADJ]
0od D + 01d D*LTV + 02d D*LOG(A) + 0M D*TEASER
+ 0M D*CAP +
D*LIFE +
D*ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

0Q (CONSTANT)

10.1168

(43.16)

0.0100

(13.97)

02 (LOG(A))

-0.1665

(-8.72)

03 (TEASER)

-0.0560

(-5.88)

0U (CAP)

-0.4890

(-15.00)

0$ (LIFE)

-0.1692

(-10.23)

P6 (ADJ)

-0.0808

(-15.83)

0Od (°)
01d (D*LTV)

-1.1205

(-0.92)

-0.0059

(-1.48)

02d (D*IXDG(A) )

0.0754

(0.76)

0M (D*TEASER)

-0.0259

(-0.35)

0M (D*CAP)

0.3874

( 2.39)

/S5d (D*LIFE)

0.1479

( 1.86)

-0.0828

(-5.99)

Py (LTV)

Pu (D*ADJ)

F
R2
n

66.54
0.26
2545

Table 6.17

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
[-4,4[
[Erate = 0 + 0. LTV + fi- LOG (A) + 0, TEASER +
CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ]
0 «i D + ^1d D*LTV + 0M D*LOG(A) + 0M D*TEASER + 04d
D*CAP + 05d D*LIFE + 0U D*ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

0Q (CONSTANT)

10.2806

(41.64)

0.0101

(13.61)

01 (LTV)
02

(LOG (A) )

-0.1623

(-8.21)

03

(TEASER)

-0.0561

(-5.80)

04

(CAP)

-0.4543

(-13.45)

05

(LIFE)

-0.2222

(-11.18)

06

(AM)

0.0805

(15.59)

-1.2843

(-1.04)

-0.0060

(-1.48)

0Od <D>
0 ld (D*LTV)
0 2d

(D*LOG(A) )

0.0712

(0.71)

0JJ

(D*TEASER)

-0.0259

(-0.35)

04d

(D*CAP)

0.3527

(2.15)

0M

(D*LIFE)

0.2010

(2.47)

06d

(D*ADJ)

-0.0826

(—5.91)

F
R2

n

64.96
0.26
2419

Table 6.18

Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
J-5,5[
[Erate • fi + fi. LTV + fi2 LOG (A) + fi* TEASER + fiu CAP
+ fis LIFE + fi* ADJ]
^od D + 01d D*LTV + fiM D*LOG(A) +
D*TEASER
+ fiM D*CAP + J8M D*LIFE + fif^ D*ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients

Parameter
Estimates

t-Statistic

fiQ (CONSTANT)

10.2561

(40.63)

0.0101

(13.28)

fi2 (LOG(A))

-0.1627

(-8.06)

fi3 (TEASER)

-0.0424

(-4.36)

fit, (CAP)

-0.4950

(-14.55)

fi5 (LIFE)

-0.2101

(-10.36)

0.0808

(15.62)

fiM (D)

-1.2598

(-1.03)

/31d (D*LTV)

-0.0060

(-1.51)

fi2d (D*LOG (A) )

0.0716

(0.72)

(D*TEASER)

-0.0395

(-0.54)

fiM (D*CAP)

0.3934

(2.42)

j8M (D*LIFE)

0.1888

(2.35)

-0.0829

(-6.00)

fiy (LTV)

fi6 (ADJ)

fiM (D*ADJ)

F
R2
n

64.42
0.27
2281

Chapter VII
Summary and Conclusions

Very little is known about the pricing behavior of
insolvent lending institutions.

This dissertation attempts

to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether
failed or failing thrift institutions will take excessive
risks by underprice their mortgage products.

In Chapter II,

background literature on disparities on the mortgage pricing
behavior of lending institutions was presented.

This

chapter also briefly reviewed the evidence on wellcapitalized lending institutions in the presence of
federally deposit insurance programs.

Chapter III examined

the pricing implications of fixed and adjustable-rate
mortgages originated by failed or failing saving and loans
institutions.

A two-state contingent-claims model of fixed-

rate mortgages was developed to illustrate the pricing
behavior of failed or failing financial institutions.

It

was argued that well-capitalized lending institutions will
concern themselves with the conditional probability that
they will remain solvent when pricing their mortgage
products.

Insolvent institutions that have very little

chance of regaining solvency, however, may not care about
borrower defaults.

These insolvent institutions thereby can

underprice their loans by offering fixed-rate mortgages at a
discount relative to the healthy lending institutions.
Furthermore, insolvent institutions may also offer fixed115
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rate mortgages at a discount as compared to solvent
institutions by underpricing the interest rate risk.

These

same arguments were also made for adjustable-rate mortgages.
For example, failed or failing lending institutions may
offer adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount and/or with a
tighter interest-rate cap to encourage continued borrowing.
In Appendix A, the pricing differential between solvent and
insolvent institutions is further illustrated with a simple
model,

since failed or failing lending institutions use the

conditional repayment probability, they will rationally
offer a lower rate on their loan products than would a
healthy institution making the same loan.

Using the

mortgage interest rate survey data obtained from the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, the underpricing theory was
empirically demonstrated.
the proposition were:

The three tests used in examining

the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt and

the Tishler and Zang tests.

These three techniques were

described in Chapter IV.
The econometric models and the empirical results for
the case of fixed-rate mortgages were presented in Chapter
V.

This chapter attempted to test whether or not insolvent

saving and loans institutions offer their fixed-rate loans
at a discount.

The results of the chow test and the

Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and Zang Maximum
likelihood optimization techniques were consistent with the
underpricing theory.

In particular, the statistical
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significance of the two differential coefficients, namely
the coefficient of the difference in the intercept and the
coefficient of the log of the loan to value ratio, further
implied that insolvent savings and loan associations
underprice their fixed-rate mortgages by charging less for
the default risk than solvent institutions.
The same results were also achieved for the case of
adjustable-rate mortgages.

In all tests the results

indicate that insolvent savings and loan institutions also
offer their adjustable rate mortgages at a discount.

The

two variables that failed or failing institutions appear to
misprice are the periodic rate caps and the adjustment
periods.

Since it is a no loss proposition for these

insolvent institutions to indulge in excessive risk taking,
they can offer adjustable-rate mortgages with tighter caps
and shorter frequencies of adjustment at a lower price.
In summary, the dissertation puts forth two theoretical
arguments for the underpricing proposition for insolvent
savings and loan institutions.

The arguments are that (1) a

failed or failing lending institution uses the conditional
repayment probability in setting credit rates on mortgage
loans, and (2) failed or failing lending institutions do not
consider capital losses from adverse changes in interest
rates in charging for interest-rate risk.

Therefore, a

failed or failing lending institution will rationally offer
a lower rate on mortgages than would a well-capitalized
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lending institution making the same loan.

The underpricing

theory is demonstrated empirically using the mortgage
interest rate survey data obtained from the Federal Home
Loan Bank board.

In light of the empirical results, it is

concluded that, indeed, insolvent savings and loan
institutions do underprice their fixed and adjustable-rate
mortgages.
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Appendix

a

Modeling the Behavior of
veiled or Veiling Lending Institutions

This appendix presents a simple model of failed and
failing lending institutions.

In particular, the model

shows that failed or failing lending institution will
rationally offer a lower contractual interest rate on
mortgages than would a well-capital!zed lending institution
making the same loan*
It is assumed that a representative lending institution
receives funds from several sources, namely the equity
capital, and deposits.

The equity capital includes the

initial investment by stockholders and retained earnings.
The third source of operating funds is deposit accounts.
This public borrowing is perhaps the most important debt
instrument for the typical lending institution.

The

representative lending institution uses these sources of
operating funds to offer mortgages and invest in riskfree
securities.

A.l

The Model Vramework

The framework used in the model is a one-period with
the following assumptions:
A(l) The typical lending institution association

maximizes its net present value.

For the one-period model,

the lending institution in effect maximizes its net end of
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period value by choosing the appropriate loan and credit
rates.
A (2) The typical lending institution's asset portfolio
consists mainly of loans and riskless securities.

It is

assumed, therefore, that the revenue of the thrift is
derived from the income of these earning assets.
A (3) The institution is a price-setter in its loan
markets.

Let H be the function representing mortgage loans

which can be expressed as:

M - "(r^rU
where
rffl = competing rate in the market
r^ = offering rate on loan
6 M <rcm'ro J / * ro«<0

5M(rcm'roJ/*r«n>0

^Mfr^r^/tfr^O

This specification assumes that the value of loans is
only a function of the competing market and the offering
rate.

The lending institution is, therefore, a price-setter

in the loan markets.
A(4) In addition to mortgages, the remaining funds are
assumed to be invested in assets such as Treasury bills.
These assets are considered to be free of risks and their
supply is perfectly elastic to the typical lending
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institution,

in reality, a lending institution also holds

some reserve cash balances to meet expected and unexpected
deposit withdrawals.

The inclusion of the cash balance

component in the representative lending institution balance
sheet will not change the result of the model.

Furthermore,

it is assumed that government securities are liquid and can
be sold rather quickly in case of unexpected demand for
cash.

Therefore, the holding of cash reserve is not

critically needed.

Since the timing of the liquidation and

the market return of these investment assets are arbitrary
and not under the control of the lending institution, the
investment function, I *= I(rf) is only a function of the
rate of return on investment, r{. The expected rate of
return of these assets are assuned to be exogenous to the
model.
A (5)

Equity capital and saving deposits are assumed to

be the only sources of funds for the lending institution.
A (6)

Deposits represent an important source of

operating funds for the savings and loan institutions.

Even

though, there are several classifications of deposit
accounts in real life, the model assumes only one type of
savings deposits for simplicity.

It is assumed that the

typical savings and loan is a price setter in its deposit
markets.

The savings deposit function, S, is of the

following form:
s * s <rcd'rod>
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where

is the competing rate in the deposit markets and

r^ is the offering rate on deposit accounts.

Also,

*S <rcd'rod>/fircd<0
i S <rcd'rod>/*rod>0

i2s(r«i'rod>/5r2od<0
This specification assumes that the saving deposits
function does not depend on the expected return on deposits,
since all deposit account in the typical savings and loan
association is federally guaranteed.

Instead, the saving

deposit supply function depends on the offering rate on
savings deposit accounts in the presence of federally
protected insurance mechanism.
A (7)

The Equity Capital position, E, of the

institution is represented by:

E = E(re)

where, re = rate of return on equity capital.
The equity capital of a lending institution represents
an important component of the liability side of the balance
sheet.

For ease of exposition, it is assumed that returns

on these capital account are exogenously given.

A.2

The Objective Expected Value Function
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Given the framework of model, the lending institution
derived profits come from the differential between earning
assets revenue and cost of operating funds.

The lending

institution chooses deposit and loan rates to maximize its
expected end of period net value.
The lending institution allocates its total operating
funds between its loan portfolio and riskless investment.
Let Y represent the total assets of the thrift institution:

Y * mY+iY
where
mY = amount of total assets in loans
iY = amount of total assets in riskless
securities.
Y * (m+i)Y
hence,
m+i « 1

In addition, the typical lending institution source of
funds are from equity capital, E, and public debts through
savings deposit accounts, S.

It can be summarized as

followed:
Y - E + S
The expected net value at the end of the period is the
sum of the net value if the loan is repaid, and the net
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value in case of borrower's default minus the equity
opportunity cost.

«

E (V) =
fi

- (1+r*) S (rcd,r^))f (v) dv

fi

+

(v+ (1+r,)I (rf)- (1+r^) S (rcd,r^,))f (v) dv
<P

-(l+re)E(re)
s.t.

(l)

M(rCT|,r0B)+I(rl)=S(rcd,r0d)+E(re)

where
fi=(l+rcJM(raB,r0|(1)
v= asset value with probability density
function f(v) and cumulative
function F(v) defined over the range

Substituting the constraint equation into (1) we get:
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E (v )= cr «»i-r f )M (rc^ r«)+ (r r rod)s (rd »rod)
6
+ (r1-r.)E{r,)-fF(v)dv

(2 )

J

*
The last term In the above equation represents the cost of
borrower's eventual default and agency costs associated with
the lending institution's eventual bankrupcy.

A.3

Optimisation Solution
Given the expected net value, the problem can be solved

by partially differentiating the objective function with
respect to the endogenous variables of the model.

The

result is the necessary conditions for maximizing behaviors
of the lending institution.

It objective function can now

be formally stated as follows:

M a x (ro*"r ?)M (

rom>+ (r r r od)s (rcd» rod>

6

+ (rf-r,)E(re)-[F(v)dv

(3)

Partially differentiating the objective net expected
value function with respect to rOT yields:

SE (V)
*=M(r^, r,J + (r^-r,) {SM (r^, r^/Sr^)
6r_
"("Ir^irJ + ll+rJ

(SM(rCTI,r0il)/6r0|1,))F(A)

(4)

also,
fiE(v)
---- =r, (<5S(rcd,r^)/ Sr^)
5rod

-r^ (tfS(rcd,r^/Sr^) -S (rcd,r^)

The second order conditions are given as follows:
52E(V)

-(2(«M(rcl(l,r0(11)/«r0M)
+ (1+r«.)

)

P(B) + (r„-r.) («JM(r„,r1.)/«r20.)
+2(«M(r ,r_>/«r„)

(6)

The above second order condition is unambiguously
negative.
Also,
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S2E (V)
“T
fir2od

= (r ,-rod) (52s (redrr^j)/SrZod

(7)

Given the specification of the lending institution's
savings deposit functions, the above equation will always be
less than zero.

A.4

The Solution
Proposition:

If it is assumed that the

probability that a lending institution is solvent
should borrowers default equals zero.

It follows

that under these conditions a lending institution
will not be concerned with pricing default risk.
Moreover, the rate charged by well-capitalized
institutions (r^) vi.ll exceed the rate charged by
failed or failing lending institutions (r^) by fi,
where fi = F*(B) (1-r,)/(1-F*(B))>0
Proof:

From the first order condition the following

expression is obtained:

V < * < r - ,r<_><F<B>-l) + <«M(r- ,r„1>/*r.1)
(F(B)+r,)) ((4M(re.,r„)/«r- )(l-F(B)))-'

(8)

Let the superscript s denote a well-capitalized or
solvent lending institution.

Further, assume that for well-
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capitalized institutions, the probability of remaining
solvent is virtually one.

Hence,

the conditional

probability of repayment is equal to the unconditional
probability of repayment.

It follows that for these

institutions, the offering rate on the mortgage will equal:

+ (iM(rc|n,rom)/5reni)(F‘(B)+r,))

((«M(rcni,r0J/*rom) (l-F’fB)))'1

(9)

Next, denote a failed or failing lending institution by
the superscript i.

Assume that the probability of

bankruptcy and the probability that any particular loan in
its portfolio defaults are not independent.

Assume that

both events depend on the state of the local economy.

Under

these assumptions, the lending institution can survive only
if local property values do well.
mortgage loans will be repaid.
it follows that

If this happens then all

From equation

(8) and (9),
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rV

rf« = ( * M (r a.'r « > / firc.>

(F-W-r’W H l - r , )

+ (( ^ ( r ^ r j / i r j (F» (B)+r,)))) '1+1 (10)

Since F*(£) - F1(/3) > 0, then the first term on the
right hand side of equation (10) is unambiguously positive.
Given that the probability that a failed or failing lending
institution is solvent should borrowers default is zero, it
follows that:

r*o."r'OT+M

(11)

where,
H=F8(B) (1-r,) (1-F*(B))'Vo

Equation (11) suggests that r^ > r^.

That is, rates

charged by solvent or well-capitalized lending institutions
will exceed the rate charged borrowers by failed or failing
lending institutions.

QED.

A.4. Conclusions
The differential pricing mechanism between solvent and
insolvent lending institutions is largely dependent upon the
probability that the institution will remain solvent in
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future periods.

This probability is conditional on the

lending institution's current financial condition.

This

approach has not been used in the determination of loans
rates.

The healthier the lending institution's at the

present time, the less likely it will be bankrupted in the
future periods, and vice versa.

Hence, the probability of a

loan default conditional on a failed or failing lending
institution avoiding bankruptcy is lower than the
unconditional probability that the same loan will default.
Since the failed or failing lending institution uses the
conditional repayment probability in setting credit rates,
it will use a higher repayment probability than does a
solvent lending institution.

As the result, the failed or

failing lending institution will rationally offers a lower
contractual interest rate on mortgages than would a wellcapitalized lending institution making the same loan.

Appendix B
In obtaining the value of the mortgage, the fundamental
valuation equation is used with appropriate boundary and
initial conditions.

There are infinite combinations of H,

r, t, which satisfy the fundamental partial differential
equation.

And since there is no closed-form solution to the

equation, boundary conditions are needed for a numerical
solution.
In general, boundary conditions fall into two
categories.

The first type is commonly known as the

terminal conditions and relates to the time to maturity of
the contract.

For a fully-amortizing mortgage, its value at

the time of maturity, T, is equal to zero, i.e. V(H,r,T) =
0.

While the terminal boundary condition for a non

amortizing mortgage is its par value.

The second category

of boundary conditions describe the value of assets at limit
values of state variables, namely the spot rate of interest
and the house prices, each approaches infinity or zero.
The model assumes that the default on the mortgage
occurs at the time of required payment.

The borrower will

exercise this option only if the value of the mortgaged
property is less than the sum of the value of the mortgage
after making the debt service payment and the amount of
payment.

On the other hand, the option to prepay the

mortgage can occur at any time.
137

The borrower will prepay
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the loan if the current mortgage value exceeds the unpaid
balance less any other costs such as prepayment penalties or
refinancing costs.
At the time of maturity, n, the value of the
prepayment is zero.

The borrower only has the option to

default on the mortgage,

since at the maturity there is

only one single payment, m, that needs to be made.

The

borrower exercises the default option only if the value of
the mortgaged property, H, is less than the debt service
amount.
For a fully-amortized fixed-rate mortgage, the
terminal conditions become:
S(T(n),n) = M
D(r(n),n) = Max[0,M-H(T(n)]
P(r(n),n) * 0 and
V(r(n),n) * min[M,H(r(n)]
where,
M:

the mortgage payment where
(a/12)L
1 - [(l/(l+a/12) )n]

U(i):

unpaid mortgage after the payment date i is made
[(1+ a/12)n - (1 + a/12)f]L
U(i)--------------------------(1 + a/12)n - 1

L:

the original mortgage amount
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a:

the annual contract rate

n:

the term of the loan in months

r (1):

the calendar time of the ith month
r(i) - i/12

S(r,t):

the value of the remaining payment stream at
time t

D(H,r,t):

the value of the default option at time t

P(H,r,t):

the value of the prepayment option at time
t

V(H,r,t) = S(r,t) - D(H,r,t) - P(H,r,t) where V(H,r,t)
is the value of the mortgage to the lender
at time t

The other category of boundary conditions involves
extreme values of the state variables.

As the value of the

house reaches zero, the borrower certainly will default on
the mortgage.

The value of the prepayment option will be

zero and so is the value of the mortgage.

P(0,r) * 0
D(0,r) = S(r)
V(0,r) « 0

As the value of the property approaches infinity, the
default option has no value.
lim D(H,r) » 0
H -* «o
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lim V(H,r) - S(r) - Lim P(H,r)
H -+ <»
H -+ oo
As the spot rate approaches zero the value of the
mortgage satisfies the following partial differential
equation:

*sah2H2(3zV/3H2) - sH(3V/dH) + dH/dt =0

Finally, as the spot rate approaches infinity, the value of
mortgage approaches zero.

lim S(r) = 0
r -* co
lim P(H,r) = 0
r -*■ oo
lim D(H,r) = 0
r -+ oo

lim V(H,r) - 0
r *♦ oo

Appendix C
THE INSTITUTIONAL PICTURE OF MORTGAGES

The purpose of this appendix is to survey the
institutional aspects of mortgages.

Section c . l begins with

a short history of mortgage lending in the United States.
Section C.2 follows with a discussion of the institutions
which participate in mortgage originations and those which
are active in the secondary market.
discusses various types of mortgages.

Section C.3 briefly
Finally, section C.4

concludes with a survey of the various types instruments
available in both the primary and secondary mortgage market.

C.l

A Brief History of Mortgage Lending

The first institutions to provide a means of obtaining
mortgage loans were the building and loan associations which
began in 1831 and flourished with the economic expansion of
the 1840's.

Prior to the early 1900's, mortgages are mostly

non-amortized with short maturities and low loan-to-value
ratio.

Between 1900 and the late 1920's, the U.S. economy

flourished as did the market for mortgages.

Building and

loan associations, savings and loan associations, mutual
savings banks, and trust companies were the major suppliers
of funds to the mortgage market.
Prior to 1930, there were five types of mortgage
lenders: mortgage brokers, mortgage loan companies, savings
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and loans, building and loans and
companies.

mortgage guarantee

During the ten years after the onset of the

Great Depression, mortgages guarantee companies had
collapsed with the real estate market and ceased to exist;
42% of the savings and loans (12,000) and 33% of the
commercial banks either merged or went bankrupt.

In

response, several entities were created: (1) the Federal
Housing Administration (1934) whose purpose was to insure
mortgages in order to stimulate the construction of
residential housing; (2) the Federal Home Loan Bank System
(1932) which was created to be a central reserve credit
system for financial intermediaries active in housing
finance; (3) the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, which insured the deposits of member thrifts;
and (4) the Home Owners loan Corporation (1933) which, for
the three years of its existence, bought the frozen
mortgages of the thrifts for 80% of par value in exchange
for 2.25% federally-guaranteed debentures which were easily
traded for cash.

The Home Owner Loan Corporation was the

most critical in reversing the mortgage credit and housing
crunch of the 1930's.
Saving and loans responded to the collapse by limiting
loan-to-value ratios to a maximum of 60% of appraised value
and time until maturity to three years.

It was the building

and loans associations who responded with the now
institutional feature of mortgages -- amortization.

In
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addition, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
was established in 1938 to buy and sell FHA-insured
mortgages.
At the end of World War II, financial institutions were
extremely liquid due to a large extent, to the policy of the
Federal Reserve System of fixing the price of government
securities so that their yields were at least 2% below that
of mortgages. At the same time, returning veterans increased
the need for both mortgage credit and housing construction.
In 1944, the Serviceman's Re-adjustment Act empowered the
Veterans Administration to guarantee loans made to veterans
obtained through private lenders. The first loans, under the
Act, were for a maximum principal of $2000, a maximum loanto-value ratio of 50%, and an interest rate of 4%.

By 1950,

the par value was raised to $7500 and the loan-to-value
ratio to 60%.

Also, after World War II, ten-year fully-

amortized conventional loans, which had replaced the three
and four-year loans, were gradually replaced by twenty-year
loans.
By 1950, housing starts were a record 1.4 million
units. This figure is double that of 1941 and almost ten
times the number for the year 1944.

This period of

expansion continued well into the 1960's and was the
successful result of both the 'baby boom* and the policies
of the VA and FHA.
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By the end of 1954, nearly 25% of the VA-guaranteed
loans closed had no downpayments and thirty years until
maturity.

By 1960, 60% of VA-guaranteed loans had no

downpayment and 76% had maturities of twenty-six to thirty
years.

These figures rose to 70% and 90%, respectively by

1970.
With the expansion of FNMA to buy and sell VAguaranteed loans, a whole new source of funds for the
mortgage market is opened up.

This was the beginning of the

expansion of today's secondary markets.

C.2

The capital Markets

C.2.1

Mortgage Financing and Financial Intermediaries
Depository institutions in the United States has been

characterized by a dual system.

On the primary level,

federal savings and loans are chartered by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and are insured by the now defunct
FSLIC, whereas state-chartered savings and loans are
chartered by state boards and are subject to state
regulations.

Thrift institutions were born to obtain

savings from the public and invest most of those funds in
home financing.

Today, thrift institutions invest a large

percentage of their assets in conventional mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities.
Commercial banks have been the largest financial
intermediary since 1920, but mortgage banking has
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historically been a small part of their business.

Today,

these institutions, hold almost 30% of all conventional
mortgage debt outstanding.

The act was revolutionary for

the mortgage market because it broadened the availability.

C.2.2

Federal Agencies

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was
born in 1938 with the purpose of creating a secondary market
in FHA-insured loans financed by borrowing from the U.S.
Treasury.

At inception, FNMA was wholly owned by the U.S.

Government but in 1954, FNMA was reorganized to be partly
government-owned and partly privately-owned and charged with
three functions: managing, servicing, and liquidation of its
existing portfolio;

providing assistance for special

housing programs; and the secondary market operations.

FNMA

later became a private corporation in charge of the
secondary market operations.

The Guaranteed National

Mortgage Association (GNMA) emerged as a government agency
responsible for the first two functions.
Historically, FNMA has served to stem the imbalance in
the residential mortgage market during periods of
disintermediation caused by rising interest rates (i.e.
1969-70, 1973-4, 1979-80, and 1981-3). For example, during
the housing crunch of 1969-70, FNMA's purchase activities
accounted for almost half of the increase in home mortgage
loans made between the third quarter of 1969 and the first
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quarter of 1970. Since 1970, FNMA has been authorized to
purchase conventional mortgages which are not FHA-insured or
VA-guaranteed.

FNMA instituted the Free Market System

commitment auction in 1968.w
GNMA was created in 1968 to take over the role of
buying VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured mortgages.

The Federal

Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ('Freddie Mac* or FHLMC),
started in 1970 as part of the Federal Home Loan Bank, is
the third largest agency active in the secondary mortgage
market.

Its purpose is to support the conventional mortgage

market by acting as guarantor of mortgage-backed securities
sold in the secondary market. 'Freddie Mac' was the first
institution to offer participation in pools composed of
conventional mortgages (1971).

It instituted the

standardization of loan applications (1973) and, two years
later, standardized mortgage contracts; both of which serve
to increase liquidity in the secondary market.

"Freddie

Mac" is currently responsible for a large portion of the
outstanding agency pass-through securities.

C.2.3

Private Companies

14Every other Monday, those wishing to sell loans submit
bids which specify the yields the FNMA would receive if it
bought them.
After reviewing mortgage and credit market
conditions, FNMA determines the lowest acceptable yields and
issues six-month commitments to buy mortgages to the
successful bidders in exchange for commitment fees.
The
commitments are put options for the mortgagees and, if rates
drop during the commitment period, sellers are able to obtain
a better price from another investor.
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In addition to federal agencies, life insurance
companies, mortgage companies also are active in the
mortgage markets.

Mortgage companies have acted both as

brokers between individual borrowers and lenders and added
their own funds through debentures collateralized by
mortgages since the mid-1850's.

By the mid-1960's, mortgage

companies were servicing 20% of all residential mortgages
and more than 50% of all FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed
residential Loans.

While mainly servicers of mortgages,

they do originate FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans for
the purpose of placing them in pools funded by the sale of
GNMA's.

Today, mortgage companies buy and sell loans to

institutions and financial intermediaries, many of which are
originated by the mortgage company itself.

They still play

an important role linking the primary and secondary markets.
Mortgage companies, for the most part, do not maintain
inventories of loans and are the primary users of FNMA's
auction program, typically accounting for more than 80% of
FNMA's purchases.

C.2.4

Mortgage Insurers
The Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans

Administration are the government agencies responsible for
insuring mortgages in the primary market.

Together they

insure about one-third of the residential mortgage debt
outstanding. Another third is at least partially insured by

148

the private mortgage industry which started in 1956.
Previously, private mortgage insurance was prohibited by
state laws due to the collapse of the industry during the
Depression.

C.3

Mortgages

C.3.1

Fixed-Rate Mortgages
Fixed-rate mortgages have a fixed interest rate and

monthly payment over its term of maturity.

The early

payments are mostly interest and slowly become increasingly
composed of principal.

Fixed-rate mortgages are the most

common type of loan and have typical maturities of thirty
years.

Given the traditional imbalance in the

asset/liability maturity structure of thrift institutions,
more institutional lenders are now offering fixed-rate loans
with fifteen-year terms.

c .3.2

Adj ustable-Rate Montages

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) are the most popular
alternative to the traditional fixed-rate loan.

ARM's have,

as the name implies, an adjustable interest rate, and is
usually tied to some financial index.
are:
notes;

Common indices in use

the rate on 6-month Treasury-bills or 3-year Treasury
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average

contract rate; and the average cost of funds for federallyinsured savings and loans.

ARMs grew in popularity as a
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solution the thrift industry's liquidity crisis of the early
1980's.

ASMs are characterized by

interest rate caps.

A

periodic cap limits the size of the change the loan will
take at each step.

An life of loan cap sets a limit on the

amount the rate may change over the life of the loan.

A few

ARMs also have payment caps which limit the maximum monthly
payment.15

C .3.3

Balloon Mortgages

Balloon mortgages are similar to fixed-rate loans in
that both the loan rate and the coupon payment are fixed;
the difference is that the final payment on a balloon
mortgage is quite large.

In some cases, balloons take the

form of bonds where the first through next-to-last payments
are only interest, and the final one is the entire
principal.

Balloon mortgages are usually short-term and

constitute a small percentage of all mortgages.

C.3.4

Graduated-Payment Mortgages

Graduated-payment mortgages (GPM's) are loans whose
monthly charges are scheduled to rise during their lives.
These loans are initiated on the assumption that the
borrower's income will also rise over time.

In the

beginning, these payments are relatively low either because
the loan rate will rise or because it is fixed and payments
15if a payment cap is triggered, negative amortization occurs.
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either include little or nor principal or they amortize
negatively.

Payments gradually rise to a fixed level and

remain their until the loan is repaid.

GPM's have been

popular with builders who want to sell new homes quickly and
induce borrowers to buy with lower early payments.

c .3.5

other Mortgages

In addition, there are Growing-Equity Mortgages (GEMs)
and Shared-Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs). GEMs are a recent
innovation in the mortgage market and blend a variable
monthly payment schedule with a fixed-loan rate.

Changes in

the monthly coupon reflect decreases in the amount of
principal remaining so that the mortgage is usually paid off
long before the contractual terms.

SAMs allow lender to

receive a percentage of the appreciation in the house in
exchange for a lower contractual rate of interest.

C.4 Mortgage-Related Securities
C.4.1

Mortgage Pass-Throughs

A mortgage pass-through security is created when a
number of mortgages are pooled together to sell to
investors.

Cashflows from the pool are passed along to

investors in proportion to their share of the pool.

The

first pass-throughs were sold by GNMA in 1970 and were
backed by FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans.

GNMA is

still the dominant agency-issuer of pass-throughs.

GNMA
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securities are backed by loans originated by mortgage banks,
thrift institutions, and commercial banks.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations was founded
in 1970 to create pass-throughs using mortgages originated
by an FHLB bank or FSLIC member, or any financial
intermediary whose liabilities are insured by a Federal
agency.

Freddie Mac is the second largest issuer of agency

pass-throughs and was the first to offer pools composed of
conventional mortgages.
The other federal issuer is FNMA which sells mortgages
originated by mortgage banks and thrift institutions.
also acts as servicer.

FNMA

Freddie Mac insures the timely

payment of interest (principal within one year) and FNMA
insures the timely payment of both interest and principal.
Both agencies also require additional private mortgage
insurance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is greater then
80% of the appraised value; the insurance must be sufficient
to reduce the liability to 75%.

In addition, both issue

pass-throughs. In order to insure that the interest on the
underlying mortgages is sufficient to meet the coupon on the
pass-through, FNMA requires the underlying loan rates to be
between 50 and 250 basis points greater than the coupon on
the pass-through.

FNMA retains 25 basis points of interest

per month on the amount of principal remaining as its fee
for guaranteeing the mortgage.

The difference between the
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interest collected less the coupon owed and FNMA1s fee goes
to the servicer.
In addition to agency-issued pas-throughs, privatelyissued pass-throughs have existed since the late 1970's.
The private pass-throughs are not a debt of the issuer and
the underlying mortgages are placed in the possession of a
trustee.

The issuer services the debt for a fee and often

serves as the guarantor.

The advantage to the issuer is the

opportunity to remove assets from the balance sheet while
earning income through the servicing fee.

The market in

privately-issued pass-throughs is small relative to that of
agency-issued pools.

C.4.2

Mortgage-Backed and Mortgage Fay-Through Bonds
Bonds backed by various mortgage instruments have been

issued since 1975 through the market is relatively small at
the present time. Mortgage-backed bonds have the same
characteristics as most corporate bonds, except that their
cashflows depends on the cashflows of the underlying pool of
mortgages.

They differ from pass-throughs in that the

cashflows on mortgage-backed bonds are fixed and
predetermined. The collateral used for these bonds can be
either GNMA's, FNMA's, Freddie Mac's.

The bond issuer has

title to the underlying mortgages, though they are placed
with a trustee, and retains all cashflows while making the
necessary payments to the bondholders.

The bondholders have
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title to the bonds, but not the collateral.

Consequently,

the bonds, like corporate and U.S. Treasury issues, are
general obligations of the issuer.

The timing and the

pattern of the cashflows of the bonds are differed from that
of the underlying mortgages.

In order to protect the

interests of the investor, the collateral is marked to the
market regularly and replenished according to the market
value rule.16
Pay-through bonds are similar to pass-throughs.

Their

cashflows are linked to the cashflows of the collateral.
Like mortgage-backed bonds, pay-through bonds are a general
obligation of the issuer and the investor has title to the
bonds,

there is also rule with regards to the amount of

collateral to the amount of bonds (par value) which can be
issued.17

c.4.3

Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs)

CMOs are multi-tranches pay-through bonds with tranches
having a fixed coupon and a stated maturity (like pools).

16The market value of the collateral must be sufficient
to redeem the bonds at par plus interest at each interval. If
the market value is less than necessary, the issuer must add
collateral accordingly. When the issuer allows the market
value of the collateral to fall below the necessary level of
the issuer defaults, the trustee takes over and sells the
collateral in order to redeem the bonds. The general result
is that mortgage backed bonds require over-collateralization
between 125% to 240% of the par value of the bonds.
17The principal plus interest on the collateral must be
at least as great as the principal plus interest on the bonds.
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Most CMO's have four tranches often with a zero coupon bond
as the last tranche.

Cashflows are prioritized so that all

tranches with the exception of the last class, receive
interest payments first, and then any remaining collateral
cashflow goes towards the repayment of principal on the
first tranche until it is retired, and then toward the
second tranche until it is paid off, and so on.

After the

next-to-last tranche is retired, the s-tranche receives all
remaining cashflows until its accrued interest and principal
are paid off.

Since the z~tranche has no interim cashflows

until all the other classes are retired, its presence serves
to accelerate the rate at which the others are retired.
excess cashflows are retained by the issuer.

Any

CMOs have the

problems of reinvestment risk and risk that the collateral
will be insufficient to meet the necessary cashflows of the
bonds, given the uncertainty of the pattern of underlying
cashflows.

The reinvestment risk occurs because the

mismatch in timing between collateral payments and the bonds
payments.

For the highest grade, rating agencies require a

conservative reinvestment rate of 3% per annum for all
future cashflows and, likewise, conservative estimates on
future prepayments in determining the degree of
overcollateralization.18 CMOs have become popular since
18The rule is that the par value of bonds which can be
guaranteed by the collateral is equal to the present value of
the cashflows of the collateral discounted by the highest
coupon of the CMO tranches or the par value of the collateral,
whichever is less.
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the different tranches allow for indifferent risk and time
preferences and still have a yield premium over treasuries.
The early tranches

minimal exposure to interest rate risk

while the longer tranches appeal to investors who want less
reinvestment risk.

Apptndlx D
Models of the Savings and Loan InstitutionI A Review

A substantial body of research has attempted to model
and explain the behavior of lending institution.

Santomero

(1984) provides a good survey of the literature.

The

overall view of a financial institution can be represented
by the following objective function.

Max E[V (Wt+T)]

(1)

subject to wt+T = wt (i+nt+1) (i+nt+2) . . . (i+nt+T)

^t*k = (S Jr AA l “

2 jr OD J "

c (A f » D j) ) / W t+k-i

where,

V(.)= the objective function with
fiV/«Wt+T>0 and 62V/6Wl+r <o
Wt+T = terminal wealth value at the horizon
time r
Ht+k = the random profit per unit of capital
during period t+k, o<k<r
rA = the random return of asset A,
rD = the random cost of deposit Dj
c (.) = the operating cost function
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Using of this approach includes models by Porter
(1961), Klein (1972), Goldfeld and Jaffee (1970), Sealey
(1980) and Flannery (1982).
In addition to the overall approach, the modelling of a
depository institution can be viewed from assets, liability
or both sides of the balance sheet.

Asset allocation models

are of two types, namely, reserve management and portfolio
choice models of asset allocation.
For an institution with earning asset A, yielding rA
and reserves R must maximize the following function in order
to maximize expected profit from deposit balances.

II - rA(D-R) - Jc(X-R) f(x)dx

(2)

where x represents the net withdrawals with density function
f(x) and c is the proportional cost to obtain additional
funds if x>R.
The basic result in reserve management model is that
the expected reduction in reserve adjustments cost, on the
margin, must be the same as the opportunity cost of
reserves:

rA - cjf (x)dx

(3)

Reserve management models includes Poole (1968),
Baltensperger (1974) and Baltensperger and Hellmuth (1976).
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Portfolio choice models of asset allocation determine an
optimal asset size for an profit maximization firm.

Shull

(1963),Klein(1971), Pyle(1971), Hart and Jaffee (1974) and
Sealey (1980) are typical of this approach, that is

Max n - 2,rAA, “ sjrDDj

(4)

Intertemporal model is

also presented by Wood (1974)

where the objective function is a multiperiod discounted
valuation function.

Maxr r n =

(5)

As for the liability choice

models the profitfunction

can be generally written as:

E * S^A, -

[(Cj - kj)nj(Dj) ]

(6)

where n is the number of deposit account transactions at the
cost c and service charge k per transaction.

Alternatively, the analysis of depository institutions
considers the entire portfolio choice problem.

Studies such

as Klein (1971), Deshmukh, et al. (1983) and Santomero
(1983) are typically examine the entire asset-1iability
management problems.
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